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FOREWORD

In this essay I will address the issue of change in the
international system which the scholars of International
Relations

have

grappled

with

however

inadequately.

Accordingly, I will argue that this deficiency stems in no small
part from the frequent mutual distance between scholars and
practitioners of international affairs. I will, therefore, try to bridge
this gap.

Ultimately this essay will:

a) Suggest a model (mutual existence of nascent and
senescent orders) equipped with a number of hypotheses
(laws) of systemic change in the international ―order‖;

b) Provide a baseline for bringing scholarly and practitioners‘
perspectives closer together, including by identifying the
crossover or mediating activities of the think-tanks and
official Policy Planning units.

ii

I

INTRODUCTION

Amidst global economic calamity the calls for a new
international order are in vogue, again. This is some surprise
because as painful as this economic crisis is, it does not
resemble the typical juncture for a sea change. As John G.
Ikenberry explains: ―At rare historical junctures, states grapple
with the fundamental problem of international relations: how to
create and maintain order in a world of sovereign states. These
junctures come at dramatic moments of upheaval and change
within the international system, when the old order has been
destroyed by war and newly powerful states try to reestablish
basic organizing rules and arrangements.‖1

In modern history, 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, 1945, 1989 are all
examples to extraordinarily critical turning points where the
victors acquire opportunity to shape new politics, set out new
rules and principles of international relations. These are the
periods when a new distribution of power abruptly emerges,
and the ―leading or hegemonic states face choices about how to
use their newly acquired power- choices that ultimately shape
the character of postwar international order.‖2 Paul Kennedy
1

agrees: ―Every so often in the history of international affairs, a
great transnational turbulence shakes the foundations of the
world and brings many of its older structures tumbling to the
ground, as we witnessed in 1919, 1945 and 1989. In the
confusion and babble that follow, it‘s difficult to see through the
dust and recognize the shape of the altered strategic
landscape.‖3

For sure, great events which form moments of discontinuity
from the standard practices and the typical are but only one of
the markers of change. As Kalevi J. Holsti explains, great
achievements like those denoted as a ―Golden Age‖ or as the
reign of a particular leader; significant social and technological
innovations; and of course ―trends‖ are also considered to mark
change in international affairs, although there is no consensus
among the IR scholars on how to define and identify change in
the international system.4 Marking and assessing change or
transformation is one challenge with which the discipline of
International Relations has found it hard to reckon.

At any rate, there is no convincing argument that the ongoing
global economic crisis amounts to a dramatic and episodic
moment the likes of which in history produced what Robert
Gilpin called the ―systemic shift‖ in the global order. 2008 is in
no way akin to 1453 when the Ottomans defeated the Eastern
Roman Empire or 1918 when the US broke its taboos about
2

military engagement in the Old Continent. It is not 1989 when
the US was left without any competing power with a rival
ideology. There was no war. No major state or bloc
disappeared. There was no political and military game changing
change of circumstances. Despite the fact that the US
Intelligence Community did warn that security risks would be
aggravated by the economic crisis, there is room for skepticism
even on that point. The economic crisis did not create new
failing states; it might have exacerbated the situation in the
already failing ones.

It is true however that it all could have been different. To the
credit of the Bush administration the vitalization of the G-20 was
a masterful move. To the credit of the Obama administration,
they continued the US support behind it. As in the 1930‘s Great
Depression, this crisis could have hastened the fall into an
international political abyss, even a global war. After all, there is
already enough political problems, geopolitical rivalries, shifts in
power balances, economic imbalances, and almost everything
else that triggered not only economic but also political and
military crises. That is not happening. The fact is 2009 is
different from 1930‘s. During the Great Depression there was
an adolescent world order. In 2009 that world order is mature
after umpteen amendments and revisions, and a record of
insufferable pain inflicted by mankind on mankind in the last
one hundred years.
3

That said, the same mature world order may also be senescent.
The current economic crisis may have produced an instance to
highlight the fact that has been almost universally expressed
but hardly acted upon: the current order of things in the world,
whichever way one defines it, is manifesting serious wear and
tear. It is maintaining a minimum order today yet should not be
expected to live up to the challenges of tomorrow. At the end of
the first decade of the 21st century, the international community
finds itself in a flux in which almost every aspect of the
international order is being challenged from the top down and
from the bottom up. Irrespective of the economic crisis, multiple
transformations are underway that are global in scope and
historic in impact. Faced with a daunting agenda, even in the
absence of a war, these may be the times when it is legitimate
to ask hard questions and take bold actions. These are the sort
of times when historic leaders, whether political or intellectual,
are made.

Against that background, the economic crisis may be an
opportunity to revamp the world order. Debates already galore.
Nevertheless, realistically speaking, no new world order, for
better or for worse, will replace the current one this time around.
Rather the next world order will be incubated in the human
civilization‘s collective womb and tested gently in reality. If
history is any guide, the basic contours of the international
4

system to come may have already made their debut. The old
and the new are living together, one shaping up, and the other
struggling to hang in.

Bar historical determinism. History did not happen in a
preordained way. Future will also be shaped by the vagaries of
human action and follies. It will be a product of an
unpredictability that humans have not as yet comprehended
and unlocked. What we think is clearly visible is only that which
is permitted by our limited knowledge and comprehension.
Truth is what we create and believe in. Knowledge is not
absolute but partial.

However, therein rests the human dilemma: We need to
understand. And, we need to participate in the shaping of the
future global environment that will surround our destinies.
Fatalism can be a personal attitude, but it is not a political
approach. Formulating policies to shape and/or respond to
changes taking place, however, is. If that be the objective, then
the task involves accurate identification and analysis of the
shifts and challenges; competent evaluation of options and
opportunities; setting out of correct strategies and tactical
policies.

5

This is no easy feat. The task to assess global change involves
questions that have no easy answers. It also concerns both the
academic and policy worlds in a way that neither can deny.
Every IR position comes from some conception of the world
system in which we live. Every international policy needs to
take account of the world system. In fact, understanding world
order and the phenomenon of global change is one subject on
which the policy and academy circles need to collaborate.

The following is a baseline effort to merge scholarly and
practitioner‘s perspectives on assessing change in international
circumstances in relation to what is already codified as world
order.

6

II

THE SCHOLAR AND THE PRACTITIONER

1. The Practitioner Also Needs Input and Innovation

Early on during my tenure at NATO my boss gave the
unenviable task of finding a way to accommodate a partner
nation‘s request to have NATO presence on its soil although
NATO nations were not yet ready to deploy their forces. For
hours I stared at a clean sheet of paper not even able to write a
title to my plan. My contacts fishing for ideas from colleagues,
superiors, friends and allied representatives did not produce
any breakthrough. Bewildered, annoyed and increasingly
stressed I took refuge in a bowl of ice cream while watching tv. I
came across an interview by the chairman of the Virgin Group,
Sir Richard Bronson, who was explaining his thinking behind
lending the Virgin brand name to a cola producer. He would not
produce cola, but lend the prestigious name of Virgin based on
a rigorous analysis of quality. What worked for Virgin, I hoped,
could work for NATO, which did not deploy forces but examined
and approved partner facilities and lent the NATO/PfP brand
7

name. I went on to draft the ―Concept for PfP Training Centres‖,
which was approved by the North Atlantic Council on 16
November 1998 according to which numbers of such centers
operate around the Euro-Atlantic geography to this day.5 I have
yet to hear a story where International Relations scholarship
came in out of the blue to help resolve a practical international
relations problem. But, I remain dedicated to continue searching
for common ground. The practitioner needs input from other
outside not only to know more but also to achieve more. This
help can come from variety of fields and should come from the
scholarship, as well.

If business and diplomacy have the shared pursuit of practical
innovations resolving problems and generating gains (in my
example, security gains for NATO and the partner in question,
not to mention personal relief in having solved the quagmire),
scholarship and diplomacy ought to have the shared hope of
making this world a better place. After all, social sciences
benefited immensely from the refugees fleeing Europe before
and during World War II carrying lasting traumas of war,
persecution even genocide. That said, scholarship and practice
is now considered to be perpetually disconnected. It should be
stated up front that I could not find any useful method for
merging the two positions. And, this disconnect is partly by
design.

8

2. The Ivory Tower

A large segment of the academia consider it necessary even
ethical to distance academic work from the subject matter which
it is observing and analyzing. This assures academic integrity,
and an enquiry that is free from values, distinguishing between
empirical facts and subjective values. It is also a way for the
academia to remain immune and neutral to the tainted world of
politics. This point of view is even enforced within the academia
by the fellow academics. President of the International Studies
Association (2003-20034) Steve Smith observed that: ―within
International Relations there have been many such disciplining
moves, right back to the famous distinction between Idealism
and Realism, through the disciplinary disputes between
behaviouralists and classicists, and now manifested in the
attack by rationalist scholars on reflectivist work, that is to say
those engaged in post-modernist, feminist and gender, Critical
Theory, ethnic and cultural approaches to International
Relations.‖6 For those who detracted from the majority view and
thus fallen out of the so-called scholarly legitimacy, there were
consequences on their career and publishing prospects,
reported Steve Smith. This is highly surprising even unsettling
for someone who thinks life within the academia, unlike life
within politics, business and bureaucracy, is a fairy tale.

9

The pretensions of isolation from the political world can itself be
subjective. Smith makes this point, writing: ―to maintain that
there is a secure isolated place where ―real‖ academics can
report on the world itself relies on a prior, usually unstated,
notion of the world. Such a view of social science takes the
world as given as it presents itself to the analyst, as external, as
separate, and does not therefore enquire into how theories both
construct, reconstruct and are then constructed in turn by that
world.‖7 What this account stops short of noting is that by
constricting intellectual and scholarly inquiry within narrow
paradigms, these conceptions are also complicit in sustaining
the ―world‖ that politics has engendered and codified in the first
place. It is not isolation; it is a live and let live perpetuation.

Equally complicit may be the opposite point of view which aims
to speak truth to power; engage the politicians and offer
detailed case studies, rather than increasingly abstract theories
and meta-theories. Although as a practitioner of international
relations I obviously welcome such detailed case studies,
although obviously not too many of them, I cannot but agree
with Steve Smith that this view of International Relations
scholarship ―tends toward the anti-intellectual in that it denies
the possibility and desirability of the discipline reflecting on
itself, and on the definitions of politics that it works within.‖8
Academia as part of the broader intellectual community needs
to be pluralistic, essentially rebellious, but preferably conscious
10

of its cultural subjectivities. The progress hardly comes from
knowing more of the same within a static paradigm. And,
paradigmatic shifts are the product of that dissenting, rebellious,
but conscious thinking.

The academic ivory tower exists. The 2008 Teaching, Research
and International Policy (TRIP) poll by the Institute for Theory
and Practice in International Relations of the College of William
and Mary identified scholars which fellow academics voted as
having produced the most interesting scholarship in the last five
years.9 Joseph Nye, who is among those honorably mentioned,
is critical of the fact that of the 25 scholars that fellow
academics have voted for only three (including himself) had any
policy experience.10 Although, Nye‘s recommendations to
increase the policy relevance of the IR scholarship mostly
concur with those of Stephen Walt and concentrate on what the
academia should do in terms of promoting policy relevant
publications and young scholars, his unstated initial premise
about the downside of academics not finding jobs in
government is open to debate.

3. The Official Ivory Tower

Obviously, whatever the academia does to be relevant, the
convergence that is required between the academia and
11

practical world is also severed from the policy side. ―Thinking
academically‖ is one pejorative qualification any practitioner is
loath to hear. It is one mud that diplomacy hardened elders and
colleagues can slap at any time with impunity. Academic is the
exact antonym of relevant or realistic. Academics are revered
as the once teachers not as the current guides. An academic
becoming a political leader has to work twice as hard to prove
him/herself as a businessman or a general aspiring to the
same.

At the same time, neither the politicians nor their advisers
including the bureaucracy would want to hear anything that
doesn‘t confirm their policy preferences. The appreciated ideas
are essentially those that square the circle already drawn by the
policy elite‘s own thinking. Exceptions usually prove the rule.

Stephen Walt may thus be right in that policy makers pay
―relatively‖ little attention to the vast theoretical literature in IR.
He is, however, even more correct in stating that ―many policy
debates ultimately rest on competing theoretical visions, and
relying on a false or flawed theory can lead to major foreign
policy disasters.‖11 Policy almost always has a certain political
background event that is distorted beyond recognition and
molded by the practical exigencies. Plethora of wrong premises
and flawed theories and postulations followed the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. A terrorist organization the political ideology of which is
12

incoherent, marginal and even outcast in any context was
inflated beyond recognition and confronted with policies that
only damaged and isolated the attacked rather than the
terrorist.

4. The Practicing Scholar

Several scholars have indeed been able to implement their
theories. The case of Professor Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu merits
separate analysis in terms of theory-policy convergence. The
author of the doctrine of ―Turkey‘s Strategic Depth‖, eponymous
with his acclaimed best-selling book, Dr. Davutoğlu has also
had the opportunity to implement his theory, first as Special
Advisor to the Prime Minister of Turkey, then as the Minister of
Foreign Affairs. Dr. Davutoğlu summarized his approach as
follows: ―In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique
space. As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia‘s vast
landmass, it may be defined as a central country with multiple
regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified
character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey
cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating
it with one single region. Turkey‘s diverse regional composition
lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions
simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of influence in
its immediate environs‖12 Bülent Aras comments that ―the new
foreign policy took form under the impact of Davutoğlu‘s re-definition of

13

Turkey‘s role in the neighboring regions and in international politics, namely its
―strategic depth,‖ with frontiers that have expanded beyond the homeland in
the cognitive map of policymaker‘s minds. The territorial limits to Turkish
involvement in neighboring countries has disappeared in this new mindset.‖

13

This doctrine engenders in the policy of ―zero problem‖ with
neighbors

and

a

multi

thronged

near

global

Turkish

engagement while not challenging, and arguably reinforcing,
Turkey‘s NATO membership and its EU accession bid.14 This is
one case where theory is turned into practice by none other
than the architect himself. A similar case could be made for the
influence of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State although in
this case Kissinger‘s realist thinking rather than his own
theorization was on the foreground.

Barring these and rather limited number of other exceptions, an
academic serving in a practitioner role does not automatically
produce the theory-policy convergence; neither does a
practitioner who had the training to employ academic methods.
That is mainly because of the inherent conflict between the two
walks of life and the associated and expected mentalities that is
not contingent on individual qualities, rather that which goes
with the territory.

5. Common Grounds

a. Shared Tasks
14

That notwithstanding, common ground does exist. The
academician and the practitioner face at least a couple of
shared tasks:

-

Firstly, both need to compile relevant and discard irrelevant
or misleading data. This task whether in terms of compiling,
but also in filtering data, is greatly aided thanks to the
diversity of third party data aggregators.

-

Secondly, they both need to assess and contextualize that
data. Irrespective of whether that contextualization would
take the form of theories, at any rate it would be consciously
or unconsciously helped by theories.

Once these two fundamental tasks are completed, from that
point on the academician has the luxury of deciding whether or
not to become immediately relevant for policy through concrete
suggestions. On his/her part the practitioner, however, is
obligated to carry his diagnosis all the way to the policy domain
almost unfailingly under dire time limitations and near universal
political, bureaucratic and cultural constraints.

Although topical case studies by the learned men and women
can often be of extreme use to the practitioner on almost all
15

sorts of policy issues, on assessing the meaning and
implications of change in the world it is particularly incumbent
on the practitioner to be aware of the intellectual lens through
which every so-called detailed analysis is likely to proceed.

The fact of the matter is that every concept of ―world order‖
rests on a certain theory about the nature of the actors in the
world, the context that surrounds them and the type of
economic, political and social interaction that exist among these
actors. The divergence of view on these points is mind
boggling. The roots of these differences of view are easily
traceable to unresolved philosophical debates about the nature
of man. Tell me who you think is right: is it Hobbes, Kant, Marx,
Rousseau or Weber? The answer may well dictate the
prognosis and prescription to follow. There are far too many
useful theories and far too little time, energy and even
opportunity to incorporate all of them into the policy world. This
is complicated by the fact that all of these mainstream and nonmainstream theories are in fact comets which include myriad
internal variations making it practically impossible for any cast
of decision makers and their counsels and bureaucracies, first
to master, then to select, and then to agree on.

However, this does not obviate the relevance of theory, and IR,
for the practitioner. First of all, theories and knowledge of them
provide a structure to thinking through issues, which in the
16

international level can involve a daunting diversity. Theories
provide an opening through which one can move beyond
knowledge as concatenation of data to knowledge that is
derived from systematic analysis and synthesis.

Secondly, most of these theories actually support a particular
conception of the international system. This is true for the
number of IR theories that is purported to be at odds with each
other, including realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism. In
their totality, these theories suggest that there is an
international order to things that is enhanced by global
institutions but in which it is ―natural‖ that the hegemon violate
the order, however the system is nonetheless malleable owing
to the potential for reconstruction of identities and actions
through learning. In that conception, free trade is the norm,
democracy is the ideal, global institutions are the way to go. If
these reflect your particular values, then the job becomes
easier.

Thirdly, from the point of view of the practitioners and policy
planners, theories provide a useful mirror to observe and
understand the aspirations, ideas, ideals, actions, intents,
purposes and even limitations of the societies and polities that
produce them. This should in no way suggest a conspiracy
between ruling elites and the academia. It is instead that
academia as human agents are a product of the sociological
17

context within which they are socialized. That the world of
theoretician is often times disconnected from the world of
practitioner does not negate this premise. Mainstream theories
become popular not only by the inherent strength of their
arguments. They attract the fascination and admiration of the
learned societies that see a certain relevance and explanatory
power with regard to the actual world. Despite the winding
debate about theory versus practice, I cannot locate any major
theory that is not considered to have a fair shot in explaining
what happened and aspires to shape policy towards what ought
to happen.

b. Shared Platforms

Against this backdrop, the common ground for synergy
exists basically on three platforms. One is task oriented, the
other two are locational:

-

Two shared tasks of the academician and the practitioner
are the first platform where a synergy is formed. Thus,
gathering relevant data and assessing what they mean as
aided by the theories.

-

Policy Planning as an analysis and synthesis oriented
bureaucratic platform can help generate synergy by
18

engaging in actual or disciplinary dialogue between
theory/scholarship and practice.

-

Think-tanks aspire to influence policy and form a bridge
between scholarship and practice.

The ideal product is not only a multi-disciplinary study, rather
one

that

is

also

multidimensional

and

multifunctional.

Multidisciplinary in the sense that IR cannot be self contained
within its own theoretical premises but need to incorporate at
least the economic and sociological aspects, as well.
Multidimensional, because the policy and scholarly emphases,
although mostly differentiated can ultimately be mutually
complementary. And lastly, preferably multifunctional when the
study ends up not only informing the debate and understanding
but also generates policy outcomes.

In the following sections I will adopt the approach I‘ve laid out
above by first completing the two shared tasks of scholarly and
policy analysis, and then to enter the academically voluntary
field of policy synthesis in the spirit of bureaucratic policy
planning.

19

In so doing I will develop and employ my own theses and pretheoretical framework in assessing change in world order and
likely policy premises for states.

20

IV

CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

1. Economic Shifts and Political Drivers of Change

As Holsti explains, ―currently, the field is in the throes of a major
theoretical reorganization precisely because change, whether in
speed, organizational types, or processes, seems to be
ubiquitous in the contemporary world. But we do not know what,
theoretically, to make of it because there is no consensus on
what we mean by change, not to mention how we identify it.‖ 15
Or, as Ruggie argues ―no shared vocabulary exists in the
literature to depict change and continuity,…we are not very
good as a discipline at studying the possibility of fundamental
discontinuity in the international system.‖16

The perplexing confusion

within the

IR scholarship is

nevertheless met with an (occasionally) complacent clarity on
the part of the broad informational sector that has emerged
between the scholars and the practitioners. The practitioners
may choose to afford not to follow the scholarly debates about
international change. However, the non-scholarly writings of
21

public intellectuals, influential columnists, as well as panoply of
think tanks and consultancy firms are omnipresent. Together
this intellectually vibrant, factually rich but scholarly unassuming
body of analysts has been reporting that a massive shift is
underway in the world.

A near unanimity exists however with regard to pinpointing the
massive economic shift in the world from the Euro-Atlantic
powers towards particularly China and India as the main driver
of change in the global system. This shift of economic power
has indeed become impossible to ignore. Since the prestigious
global financial services firm Goldman Sachs published its
paper ―Building Better Global Economic BRICs‖ in 2001, the
countries making up the so-called BRICs have achieved
staggering pace of development. The combined weight of
Brazil, Russia, India and China has already reached 15% of the
world economy. The BRICs are expected to overtake the
cumulative size of the G7 countries by 2035. The BRICs are not
alone on the path to reconfiguring the world‘s top echelons of
economic pecking order. In 2005 Goldman Sachs then
identified the Next Eleven (N-11) countries which ―could
potentially have a BRIC-like impact rivaling the G7‖. Although
the main criterion for the selection of these eleven countries
was their population size, the group included Mexico, Korea,
Turkey and Vietnam which ―have both the potential and the
conditions to rival the current major economies or the BRICs
22

themselves.‖17 This is what Fareed Zakaria deftly called the
―rise of the rest‖18.

The shift in the economic balance of power is driven mainly by
the explosion of manufacturing and some service industries in
Asia that is aided by lower costs and deliberate government
policies including regarding exchange rates. In the case of
Russia and the Gulf States high oil and commodity prices were
the main factor increasing their prospects. In turn, these two
factors have created two consequences which are potentially
lasting:

One is that the locus of manufacturing has shifted to Asia. This
has resulted in the shift of some 2.7 million manufacturing jobs
to China from the US alone between 2000 and 2008. Today
China by itself produces 40% of all microwave ovens sold in
Europe; 50% of cameras, 30% of air conditioners, 30% of
televisions, %25 percent of washing machines and some 20%
of refrigerators sold in the entire world. Add other Asian
countries and the picture becomes even more vivid for the US
and Europe, the latter particularly if it fails to incorporate Turkey
as member.19

Secondly, extraordinary amounts of funds accumulated in the
hands of governments. The special investment funds broadly
23

labeled as Sovereign Wealth Funds now amount to an
estimated $3 trillion. Despite their significant depreciation due to
the global economic crisis, the forecast is that these funds that
manage government wealth can reach $12 trillion by 2012.

Together these two consequences consolidate a trend towards
greater economic clout on the part of what Parag Khanna called
the ―Second World‖.20 The economic crisis has further
reinforced the erosion of the Western centric international order.
As shockwaves from the collapse of US banks‘ rampant
practice of providing high risk mortgage loans to people with
poor credit histories led to a global credit crunch, pundits
around the world have come to debate whether the deregulated
market capitalism has reached the end of its lifetime and would
now have to be reorganized. The view began to spread that the
neoliberal policies of the last 30 years were the reason for this
crisis. Financial Times warned against the reversals of
globalization.
The size of the bubble that was artificially created in the world
through unregulated financial engineering is hard to fathom.
The total value of assets such as mortgages, stocks, loans,
bonds and the like is around $15 trillion. The bubble emerges
when these assets are reinvested in financial contracts whose
notional value, multiplied through reinvestments in derivatives.
Thus, the funds thus inflated have reached in 2007 some $596
trillion or even over $700 trillion, according to different
24

estimations. Compare this to the total value of goods and
services produced in the entire world, which amounts to around
$65 trillion.

Estimations vary because no one actually knows the exact size
of the financial bubble due to the type of accounting involved.
The notional value of a derivative is contingent on the value of
the real asset or index. While the latter is recorded on balance
sheets, there was no rule to record the notional value artificially
generated.

Famous

investor

Warren

Buffet

called

the

derivatives ―financial weapons of mass destruction.‖ This too
smart by half financial wizardry made possible only because
nation states starting with the US failed miserably in bringing an
order and control over the practices accelerated since 2007 and
then exploded causing a chain reaction around the world‘s
financial institutions. By early 2009 there was little doubt left
that by the inevitable metastasis of the financial crisis to the real
sector, the world writ large was engulfed in an economic crisis
the depths of which were yet to be seen. Global capital that
operates in the ―no-state land‖ beyond national sovereignty
would have to be brought under control perhaps through global
institutions. The initial panic was instigated by the fact that the
money involved was not only heaps larger than the total GDP of
the world‘s largest economy; it was heaps larger than the entire
global GDP. It was aggravated by the cries of a ―ticker culture‖
whose sense of historicism is measured in minutes not eras.
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Fareed Zakaria observed: ―Over the last six months, the
doomsday industry has moved into high gear. Economists and
business pundits are competing with each other to describe the
next Great Depression. Except that the world we live in bears
little resemblance to the 1930s. There is much greater and
more widespread wealth in Western societies, with middle
classes that can withstand job losses in ways that they could
not in the 1930s.‖21 By mid 2009 the panic, but not the crisis,
began to settle down. On the other hand, the sense of exigency
and even doomsday forecasts have in fact helped avert a
repeat of the 1930s. Governments reacted in a speedy fashion.
They have taken measures including by trying –although not
always succeeding- to resist the temptation to turn inward,
which proved calamitous in the 1930s. The world order
survived.

Irrespective of the economic crisis, multiple transformations
have long been underway that are global in scope and
potentially historic in impact. There is a case that the current
economic crisis will need to have ramifications albeit gradual
and minimal for the global and national economic systems. This
is because the abrasion in the consensus behind the current
global order is all too obvious. The trust in the Western led
global financial structure is broken. The necessity for a more
representative global power structure is widely acknowledged.
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Globalization as an economic phenomenon has been hurt not
the least by growing economic nationalism, including more
assertive state control over the economy and the motivation to
accumulate foreign current reserves while limiting current
account deficits. Given the linkage between economy and
politics, the economic crisis may have longer term political
implications, as well.

The challenges are manifold and concurrent. Any shortlist of the
high order systemic challenges would include the stagnation in
the reform efforts of the current cornerstone international
organizations including the UN Security Council and the G8 as
well as the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO; the
depreciation of the powers to lead on the part of the
superpower; EU‘s tragic introversion and lack of vision and
direction; the demise of the confidence in the neoliberal
prescriptions; the lack of coherent alternative economic
prescriptions that would simultaneously generate growth and
remedy inequalities; the inability to deal collectively with the
transnational issues foremost economic development, trade
liberalization and climate change, as well as terrorism; and the
dismal failure in stabilizing the failing states around the world;
not to mention the need to reinvigorate global good governance
and the rule of international law.
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The

crisis

has

also

aggravated

existing

problems

of

international security. The US Director of National Intelligence
warned in February 2009 that global economic turmoil and the
instability it could ignite had outpaced terrorism as the most
urgent threat facing the United States. Similar warnings came
also from the UK. As the economic drama unfolded, of all the
rising stars only Russia launched an armed anti-US and thus
anti-systemic challenge to the global power structure when it
invaded Georgia in August 2008. Russia thereby underlined
with broad strokes its influence zone against the countries that
seek to ensure their security under Western institutional
umbrellas. China, India and Brazil as almost every other
ascendant power around the globe have been acting within the
system albeit with varying degrees of critical discourse.
Nevertheless, several observers indicated that a process was
underway for the US, which became the leading economy at
the turn of the last century and the leading pole in the 1990‘s, to
increasingly share ―authority‖ and seat at the global power
equation. Irrespective of the merits of this point, there is already
an actual pressure building in that direction.

Geopolitics is back –if it ever went away- with a vengeance. As
Robert Kaplan aptly describes: ―rather than eliminating the
relevance of geography, globalization is reinforcing it. Mass
communications and economic integration are weakening many
states, exposing a Hobbesian world of small, fractious regions.
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Within them, local, ethnic, and religious sources of identity are
reasserting themselves, and because they are anchored to
specific terrains, they are best explained by reference to
geography. Like the faults that determine earthquakes, the
political future will be defined by conflict and instability with a
similar geographic logic. The upheaval spawned by the ongoing
economic crisis is increasing the relevance of geography even
further, by weakening social orders and other creations of
humankind, leaving the natural frontiers of the globe as the only
restraint.‖22 At any rate the order of globalization is expanding
inexorably towards the areas it has little touched. Globalization
with its economic, political, social and institutional precepts
must to expand. And, that expansion is not a bad thing.
However the transition is not easy.

Remaining out of the system is the default position the inertia of
which is hard to beat. However, the cost of staying out is far too
heavier for the countries concerned and the world at large. The
geopolitics of world order expansion will have significantly
diverse effects on the countries involved. Some will successfully
adapt and prosper, while several others will likely be squeezed
under

failing

state

structures,

economic

and

social

backwardness, and external interventions. Overall, as before,
also in the future, staying out will be significantly more costly
than accomplishing transfer towards the center. However, this
geopolitics can also be tricky for the major powers. India and
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China are already competing in the Indian Ocean. Other races
should be expected around the world. Historically, the process
of pulling in China into the global economic market and the USJapanese competition around 1917 produced deep shocks,
even entry of the US into a World War. In our day and age, four
regions in particular seem to be subject to strong currents and
potentially shocks of globalization. These are Iran, Afghanistan,
Pakistan; former Soviet Union‘s non-EU territories; former
Ottoman Empire‘s Middle Eastern territories; Africa. The Indian
Ocean and the Mediterranean in this regard will be standing as
geopolitical center stages.

2.

Concepts

of

the

World

System:

The

Scholarly

Perspectives

I prefer the terminology of world system rather than the world
order but will use both interchangeably. At least since the UN
General Assembly advanced a plan in 1974 to redistribute
wealth from rich to poor nations which it called the New
International Economic Order and Henry A. Kissinger as
Secretary of State in the mid-70's talked about "a new structure
of stability, a new order of peace", the term new world order,
and especially ―new world order‖, has in fact been overused
over time by politicians, media commentators and academics
alike, often meaning different things. The term may even be
tainted given the numerous conspiracy theories associated with
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it. Obviously I would not know about the objectives of putative
secret societies that aim to establish global dominion. However,
that aside, the issue of the nature of the international
architecture is a worthwhile topic of intellectual and scholarly
scrutiny as well as a major policy-planning task.

The term is much abused as it is incoherent. We read from
Stanley Hoffman that at a conference organized in Italy in 1965
five possible meanings for ―world order‖ were identified by the
late French philosopher and political scientist Raymond Aron:
―Two of the meanings were purely descriptive: order as any
arrangement of reality, order as the relations between the parts.
Two were analytical, partly descriptive, and partly normative:
order as the minimum conditions for existence, order as the
minimum conditions for coexistence. The fifth conception was
purely normative: order as the conditions for the good life.‖ 23
Georg Sørensen in a bid to cut through the confusion offers
another definition: ―a governing arrangement among states,
meeting the current demand for order in major areas of
concern‖.24 This definition, like the long list of alternatives that it
aims to clarify, is also fraught with problems. My own definition
would be that a world order is the body of rules, principles,
organizations, and anticipated actions considered to be
governing the functioning, norms and purposes of the
international system. This, admittedly, is also irreparably
problematic.
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Different theories of ―world order‖ reflect their particular
reference points with regard to the nature of the actors, the type
of economic, political and social interaction that exist among
them and the international context. Aron, reportedly asked the
participants in the conference to focus on the ―minimum
conditions for coexistence‖. This reflects an ubiquitously realist
perspective to world affairs which, according to realists, have
not left the state of the law of the jungle: ―The society of
sovereign states is in essence asocial, since it does not outlaw
the recourse to force among the ‗collective persons‘ that are its
members. Order, if there be one, in this society of states is
anarchical in that it rejects the authority of law, of morality, or of
collective force.‖25 Henry Kissinger argues that there are only
two roads to stability: one is hegemony; the other is equilibrium.
The latter is a restatement of the balance of power concept
which frames the substantive content of the realist conception
of the world order.

Realists, who include among them a bewildering number of
powerful intellectual icons from E.H. Carr to Kenneth Waltz,
would thus argue that since world order is created and
maintained by the power of state, orders would change with the
changing distribution of state power. In conditions where
hegemony is not achievable, world orders are created and
recreated as rivaling states in the fundamentally anarchic
international stage balance each other. Rules and institutions
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are the product of this inherently volatile state of affairs. They
may be created by enlightened awareness of the factors that
create equilibrium. Alternatively, they could be the coincidental
result of the balance that was conceived. The bottom line is that
when the balance of power is upset, so does the order. Wars
and power politics are accepted as natural and oftentimes the
only means available for altering undesired political or territorial
conditions. Any concept of order, realist thought would argue,
does not abnegate the reliance on armed forces, secret
diplomacy,

and

shifting

alliances.

The

consequence

of

disequilibrium would be conflicts or even hegemonic war which
in turn creates a new order as part of a postwar settlement. The
order that is thus created would reflect the preferences of the
hegemonic state, which would use its power to establish and
maintain a particular arrangement.

Realism and versions of it are the most pervasive and resilient
of all theories and they are also considered common sense.
After all, who can really refute the fact that if a state, democratic
and capitalist or not, had enough power and will, it would do
whatever it is that it can afford to do in order to maximize its
interests even it that implied rupturing of an order it had the lead
in establishing? If you are trying to refute this premise, please
stop. From the perspective of any policy maker, the abnegation
of the responsibility to take this possibility fully into account
would be indefensible. Realism, and I am grouping versions of it
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such as neo-realism into one school, has enjoyed global and
timeless appeal across all polities and cultures. It predates the
emergence of International Relations as a discipline and can
very well be vibrant beyond it. After all, realists even count
Thucydides among them. Yet, realism is not alone being helpful
in providing insight and the insight it provides is not
representative of the whole picture. Balance of power or
hegemony premise of realist and neorealist theoreticians could
not be taken at face value.

To begin with, it is hard to deny that there is a certain
international order that is applicable in most of the times.
Voluntary ruptures of a particular minimum international order
are not the rule but rather exceptions both in terms of the
number of actors which can afford such behavior and the
number of times they could afford it with relative impunity. There
is a living and breathing system in place which includes the
states as individual actors, states as part of groupings,
international organizations that have a logic and sense of their
own, and international law that does not have enforcement
mechanisms comparable to developed national legal systems
yet work through public pressure. This political layer lives
alongside an economic order, which have national economies,
international economic and trade groupings, multinational
economic entities, private business that are truly powerful, not
to mention international financial accumulations that are beyond
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any country‘s sovereign control, not to forget again international
law. As such, international organizations and international law
are both the progenies and gatekeepers of a minimum
international order that exists and works everyday. Hence, the
usefulness of the neo-liberal theories in highlighting and
appreciating that phenomenon.

Neoliberal IR theories tell us that institutions are contracts
among actors whose purpose is to reduce uncertainty about the
actions of other actors. This approach needs to be seen in the
context of the idealist view which disagrees with the realists
―over

the

capacity

of

human

society,

and

especially

international politics, to eliminate the vagaries of existence in an
anarchic state system.‖26 Accordingly, the international system
is flawed because of the outmoded forms of human
organization, whether domestically or internationally. These
deep flaws however could be meliorated. Thus, states build
institutions in a bid to realize joint gains, restrain opportunistic
behavior, create norms, and where possible adopt enforcement
mechanisms. The institutions mitigate the conditions of anarchy
while reducing the transactional costs. As such institutions are
utilitarian and functional ―agreements about a structure of
cooperation‖.27 These institutions in return for the benefits they
provide require the acceptance of constraints on individual
behavior. The world order includes a host of multilateral
institutions which ―like governments…issue rules and publicly
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attach significant consequences to compliance or failure to
comply with them-and claim authority to do so.‖28

They nonetheless do not simulate all functions and jurisdictions
of a state. For instance, they stop short of monopolizing the
legitimate use of force within a specified territory, at least
without the consent of their constituent states. Examples to
such ―global governance institutions‘‘ include the UN Security
Council, the International Criminal Court and the other
international permanent courts and tribunals, the International
Monetary Fund as well as the World Trade Organization. This
includes the other non-governmental networks including those
of judges and regulators. Anne Marie Slaughter observes:

―We live in a networked world. War is networked: the
power of terrorists and the militaries that would defeat
them depend on small, mobile groups of warriors
connected

to

one

another

and

to

intelligence,

communications, and support networks. Diplomacy is
networked: managing international crises — from SARS
to climate change — requires mobilizing international
networks of public and private actors. Business is
networked: every CEO advice manual published in the
past decade has focused on the shift from the vertical
world of hierarchy to the horizontal world of networks.
Media are networked: online blogs and other forms of
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participatory media depend on contributions from readers
to create a vast, networked conversation. Society is
networked: the world of MySpace is creating a global
world of "OurSpace," linking hundreds of millions of
individuals

across

continents.

Even

religion

is

networked…‖29

Slaughter takes the argument even further by pointing out that
the emerging world order will exist ―above the state, below the
state, and through the state.‖ Accordingly, the state will
continue to exist and maintain its position as the main
constituent element of the global order. But, ―state with the most
connections will be the central player, able to set the global
agenda and unlock innovation and sustainable growth.‖30

Theories by their nature are abstractions derived from
observation of the reality. They reflect what the theorists sees
as ultimately essential and what expendable. The particular
philosophical lens shapes the angle through which this
selection is made and the reality interpreted. As such, both the
realist and liberal strands of international relations theory adopt
a filter to understate the role of ideas, identities and norms in
world politics. Enter the Constructivists who bring this focus into
the debate on world affairs and orders.
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Constructivists argue that ―the identity and interests of states
(and other actors) change across contexts and over time. Who
actors are and what actors want is determined by their
interactions with other actors and by the larger social context in
which they exist.‖31 States learn to act in a particular way. Their
socialization within the international society influences what
states pursue and how they define their interest. As the
behavior and interactions of actors change over time, so does
the context of world politics. International institutions shape the
behavior of states in accordance with socially constructed
worldviews. Interests and actions are defined by the pattern of
relationships that are set out in these institutions. In the words
of Peter Katzenstein, ―institutionalized power can be seen to
mold the identity of the states themselves and thus the interests
they hold.‖32 Change in the world order is a result therefore not
only of the relative capabilities of the states but also of the
current thinking on the principles and purposes that shape the
basic identities of states. In the words of Alexander Wendt, in ―a
world in which identities are learned and sustained by
intersubjectively grounded practice, by what states think and
do, is a world in which anarchy is what states make of it.‖33

Wendt also argues for the inevitability of a world state within
100-200 years, which would be a product of the struggle of
individuals and groups for recognition of their subjectivity, as
well as the logic of anarchy, which generates a tendency for
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military technology and war to become increasingly destructive.
The instabilities of a system of states would usher in a society
of states, which would also be unstable. Thus, a world society
would emerge to be improved by collective security and
ultimately by the world state, in which ―as in territorial states
today, cooperation… would be mandatory and enforceable.‖ 34
This obviously is the kind of an end-state that conspiracy
theories have actually been alluding to for long time. Since the
emergence of the world state is deemed to be historically
contingent and the nation state should be expected to resist its
demise, a struggle should be as inevitable as the world state.
Constructivism although considered a rebel within mainstream
IR scholarship is nonetheless not only mainstream but currently
most popular within academic circles.

The mainstream theories, like the international order they
postulate about, are those that reflect the particular viewpoints
and interests of the major forces, whether economic, political,
military

or

ideational,

that

had

shaped

the

particular

international order in the first place. Otherwise, these theories
would be located at the fringes and left outside the mainstream.
The mainstream theories almost inevitably perpetuate the
centrality of the major state actors, their political and economic
regimes, and the preferred modes of interactions among state
and non-state players. As such, much of the IR theorization is
actually of less relevance and use from the standpoint of much
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of the rest of the world. The most important possible exception
arises when the rest of the world must assess the politics and
current behavior of the most powerful actors at the top of the
global pecking order. In these cases, the mainstream theories
may be of use in assessing why, when, how‘s of great power
actions. In turn, the theories that do not start off from the
centrality of leading powers and their preferred political,
economic and institutional ideas and norms are of less
relevance to those who have the upper hand in shaping the
international order by their leverages and actions.

Although Wendt, also makes a case that his argument in favor
of World State has ―interesting‖ grand strategy implications, I
have serious doubts as to whether any state can have a 100
year grand strategy in place. It may sound banal, but in fact the
default position for the primary mental frame of policy makers
across cultures and time is located somewhere between
―realism‖, ―pragmatism‖ and whatever is considered to be
―common sense‖. In reality, I suspect, ―bandwagoning‖ is as
much a factor as anything else, at least for most of the actors. A
limited number of US and other Western think tanks and
newspapers and TV channels shape assessments around the
world in much more effective ways than countless empirical
studies and theoretical ruminations. In international relations,
reality is what it is perceived to be, not what is empirically
proven to be. In that regard, constructivist point of view is not
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too far off from restating what states have known all along:
socialization and indoctrination, and the ―control‖ of the means,
is as important in the international scene as it is domestically.
Whether in the form of subtle public diplomacy or aggressive
information operations and propaganda, influencing the nature
of information is a vital task. This is particularly so in open
societies and democratic regimes although others are surely
not exempt.

These may be the dominant Western IR paradigms, but they
are not the only one. The hopelessly divided IR scene is in fact
rich and diverse in contending or non-mutually exclusive
theories, meta-theories, pre-theories, theses and postulates.
For instance, Orientalism and Post-Colonial theory, which I
haven‘t addressed in this essay, also offer equally stimulating
and

interesting

perspectives.

This

body

of

scholarship

competes to quantitatively or qualitatively ―prove‖ that their
particular image of world order has the explanatory power of the
reality as was, as is and as would be.

In this regard, Robert Harkavy identified seven models or paradigms
which he calls ―discrete images‖ whose proponents assert would
define international reality. Although his article was written in 1997
these models continue to contest. These include the three-bloc
geoeconomics; the multipolar balance of power model hinged on the
traditional "realist" and/or neo-realist frameworks; the controversial
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"clash of civilizations" thesis; the unipolar dominance model, related
to the traditional geopolitical "long cycle" theory and to theories of
"hegemonic stability"; the "zones of peace" versus "zones of turmoil"
model based on the apparently widening gulf between the developed
and developing worlds; the "global village" model based on the
apparent shift of power and sovereignty from nation-states to
international or non-governmental organizations, and the growth of
functional global regimes; the bipolar-redux model anticipating either
a future challenge to U.S. dominance by China, Russia, Japan, or
Europe, or a return to some sort of bipolar bloc structure.35

As Harkavy notes, these models are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. The author of the Clash of Civilizations, Samuel
Huntington, himself stated a world otherwise defined by the "clash of
civilizations" might be alternatively characterized by "One World:
Euphoria and Harmony" akin to Fukuyama‘s end of history
predicated on the global acceptance of representative government
and market economics; "Two Worlds: Us and Them" such as rich
north versus poor south or the West versus the rest or market
economies versus state capitalists; "184 States, More or Less,"
which is builds on classical realism; or "Sheer Chaos" which again
can come under the realist paradigm and denotes a point beyond
zones

of

turmoil

thesis

predicting

governmental

collapse,

disintegration of states, ethnic, sectarian and tribal warfare, refugee
torrents, rampant proliferation and terrorism in the developing world.

Before moving on, I should also recall that IR scholarship is by no
means exclusively theoretical and includes an even richer body of
case study literature. These mostly describe, analyze and interpret a
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particular clearly narrowed down topic or region or phenomenon.
There is however less to be said on those because as valuable as
these

studies

are

they

do

not

carry

a

presumption

of

comprehensiveness and of explanatory power for the world system
writ large. And, they are under strong competitive attack from the
think tank and third party consultancy world in terms of relevancy for
the policy world, a point I will return later in this essay.

3. Theoretical Conceptions of Change

I have referred to the difficulty in pinpointing what exactly is
meant by change although analysis of change is inherent in the
field of international relations theory. Holsti is critical of the
proliferation of terminologies without a coherent sense of what
is important and what is not:

―A whole new vocabulary of clichés or analogies has
invaded debate. ―Globalization,‖ the ―global village,‖
―spaceship

earth,‖

―interdependence,‖

the

―new

millennium,‖ ―the borderless world,‖ and the like, suggest
that we have entered, or are entering, a new era or epoch
in which contemporary ideas, practices, institutions, and
problems of international politics are fundamentally
different from their predecessors. But popular monikers,
while evocative of things that are different, do not
substitute for rigorous analysis. Lacking in all of this claim
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of novelty is a consensus not only on what has changed
but also on how we can distinguish minor change from
fundamental change, trends from transformations, and
growth or decline from new forms.‖36

Holsti goes on to argue that there are five conceptions of
change which he lists as: ―change as replacement‖; ―change as
addition‖; ―dialectical change‖; and ―change as transformation.‖
Accordingly, in the concept of ―change as replacement‖, a
significant change happens which is usually the antithesis of
something old. Thus, if the assertion is correct that the end of
the Cold War has made war among great powers improbable,
then a significant pattern in relations among such powers has
changed. That in turn points to a major discontinuity and
replacement of the old not a transformation.

Under

―change

as

transformation‖,

quantitative

changes

accumulated and in time produce something new. Here there is
certain continuity between the old and the new.

―Change as addition‖ involves complementary features to arise
and exist alongside what already is present. The fact that
internal wars are more common does not negate the premise
that external wars can and do happen as before. Old patterns
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and concepts are not inevitably replaced. Instead they are
further complicated.

Last but not least, the concept of ―dialectical change‖ can mean
the old and new interacting to produce something novel but
continuous which is not a total replacement. The Marxist
version of this concept can also mean the thesis and the antithesis producing a superior synthesis.

Holsti‘s classification can be more complicated than necessary.
The distinction between transformation, dialectical change and
addition is although valid it is also fine. A dialectical interaction
is always at play in social phenomena and especially in the
international stage, all transformations begin with an addition.
Those additions if they manage to resist the corrosive influence
of time and events and find the appropriate context culminate in
a transformation. The question of impact is therefore most likely
to be a result of time and opportunity. The cataclysmic or
systemic moments provide for the latter. And, the concept of
change as absolute replacement is almost unrealistic and
extremely rare. The UN in all reality except in legal sense did
not totally replace the League of Nations it has transformed it
and created something new out of the genes of something
existing. The Warsaw Pact is dead but there is the CSTO albeit
much different in many respects. Although, far too many
commentators write in a way that seem to suggest total
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ruptures and discontinuities, it is hard to think that they actually
mean it all the time. Are there truly that many thinkers who
believe that that in the international system something old is
totally effaced when something different arrives? The most
notorious example of a verbal abuse is the title of Francis
Fukuyama‘s 1992 best seller The End of History and the Last
Man. The sophisticated albeit flawed argument that Fukuyama
sets out in that book is totally victimized by a title that sells the
book but allows the inherent argument to corrode rather
immediately under sunlight. Examples to snappy wordage,
titling, but also argumentations, flash news assertions of new
world orders, clean breaks, unprecedented developments and
other superlatives must be a lamentable anti-intellectual
malaise of our contemporary culture and economy.

At

the

same

time,

basic

question

implied

in

Holsti‘s

classification is truly insightful: what constitutes meaningful
change and not a ―mere quantitative change on a particular
dimension of international communication over a relatively short
period of time‖. In Holsti‘s words ―for the stock market player,
the day‘s events, or the week‘s economic trends may be a key
component of buy or sell decisions. But for the theorist of
international politics, mere quantitative change on a particular
dimension of international communication over a relatively short
period of time will probably be of little interest unless those
trends have a demonstrable major impact on how diplomatic,
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military, or commercial things are typically done. The change
must have significant consequences.‖ In Rosenau‘s terms that
significant change happens when the established and time
tested basic rules, including norms, procedures and institutions
become ―variables‖ although Rosenau himself is conflicted
whether to subsribe to an additive notion of change or one that
is based on replacement.37 How do these ruminations help
assess the changes in the international order?

4. Orders and Collapses: Anatomy of Change

Examination of these shifts and their drivers individually
however do not suffice in conceptualizing change in a
comprehensive fashion. That is when the need for a
comprehensive framework of understanding change is needed
both by the practitioner and the scholar.

Unfortunately, the fact is there is no consensus among the
scholars of International Relations on how to define and identify
change in the international system.38 Marking and assessing
change or transformation is one challenge with which the
discipline of International Relations has found it hard to reckon.

The popular premise among IR scholars is that world orders
change in a cycle of war, breakdown and reconstruction in what
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Peter Katzenstein called a ―sequence of irregular big bangs.‖ 39
In modern history, the end of the two world wars as well as that
of the cold war are examples of extraordinarily critical turning
points where the victors acquire opportunity to shape new
politics, set out new rules and principles of international
relations. In reality, great ―events‖ such as wars or their endings
are not the only markers of fundamental change. Great
achievements or failures during the reign of particular leaders;
major social and technological innovations and discoveries also
considered to mark change in international affairs. All these
however take a snapshot fixed in time or period of ceremonial
beginnings and endings at the cost of the incremental
processes that precede them.40 The analysis of trends, whether
mega- or micro- do go further in indicating change as it flows in
historical course yet again are specific in focus and not
comprehensive in conceptualizing overall change. In the
ensuing paragraphs, I suggest a model of change in the world
system built upon a series of hypotheses that mark the
evolution of the global order.

Hypothesis One:

Any international order is, in fact, reflective of the global political
and economic architecture which in turn is a codification
permitted by a period‘s circumstances. It reflects the minimum
that is achievable in a sustained fashion. The wars and other
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systemic moments facilitate adoption of a certain arrangement
which is beneficial to the victor. Nonetheless, even from the
victor‘s standpoint that arrangement reflects a compromise that
is acceptable at a given mortal moment. In a world that will
always be in flux there is no future-proof world order or
―perpetual peace.‖

Hypothesis Two:

As such, a world order is not a novel creation but an
arrangement that is naturally selected from among the already
extant options. Those options and the overall arrangement
cannot be too much ahead of its time without being
incomprehensible. Instead, those arrangements do not reflect
only the interest of the powers to be. These concrete institutions
and setup of a world order also represents the niveau of
thinking already reached among the policy makers and their
learned and lay publics. Therefore, what exists and what will
supplant are most probably already here with us, one in
senescent, the other in nascent or prototypical form. The world
order at any moment thus coexists with its successor. This
redundant existence ends with the demise of the old but is soon
to be re-enacted with the birth of the next.

Hypothesis Three:
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The next order will be carrying the genes of its predecessor
complete with several flaws that pass from generation to
generation. The realists are right in pointing out to these
endemic flaws, but constructivists are also right to assume that
some of these are containable. Institutions, liberals would come
in here, are one way of containing and transforming these
flaws. Ultimately, however, realists are likely to be right again as
when orders collapse or when an action of a determined actor
is not deterred havoc would break. The Power Transition
theoreticians may also offer useful insights in that regard by
indicating when instability would peak and due to tension
between which types of powers.41

The mainstream classification is to treat post World War I and
post World War II world orders as separate. By the end of World
War I a new political world order did indeed start to take shape.
However, alternatively, one could also argue that it took a
calamitous crash of the world economy particularly of the most
advanced capitalistic economies of the US and Germany but
not the Stalinist Russia; a cataclysmic crash of liberalism and
the ascent of totalitarian ideologies; a total world war that killed
tens of millions of people for this world order to be refined and
fully instituted. The idea captured and promoted by the
President although not the Congress of the leading power was
―replacing a balance of power approach to world order with one
based on collective security under the auspices of the
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organized international community.‖42 Accordingly, the League
of Nations established to ensure collective security; to assure
functional cooperation; and to execute the mandates of peace
treaties, as set out in the Covenant of the League. The
Covenant became Part I of the peace treaty of Versailles. The
creation of the League was followed by the institution of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. The United States
which created the institutional underpinnings of the new world
order opted not to participate in it. European powers probably
agreed to the League out of deference to President Wilson
whose forces ended the war of the trenches.

The League of Nations may have been the creation of a victorious
President Wilson who worked hard to realize his ―program for peace‖
which pronounced as item 14 that a ―general association of nations
must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording
mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to
great and small states alike.‖ Yet, President Wilson‘s fourteen
principles for world peace were in fact derived from the ―18 Final
Recommendations to End the War and Foster Peace‖ adopted in
1915 International Women‘s Congress held in The Hague where
some 1,200 delegates from twelve countries were represented.
Furthermore,

the

International

Peace

Bureau

of

the

Interparliamentary Union established in 1889 by pacifist members of
parliament was an inspiration for the League. These ideas and
forerunner initiatives were seized by President Wilson whose political
clout in Europe helped transform them into tangible institutions
supporting the world order.
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The League was not without its achievements. Its work in aiding the
refugees of war, in improving health services and labor conditions
around the world, as well as the settlement of the dispute over the
Aland Islands and the Greek-Bulgarian conflict are among its notable
successes. Yet, League‘s failings were phenomenal. These included
Japan‘s invasion of Manchuria, France‘s occupation of Ruhr, Italy‘s
occupation of Kerkira (Corfu) and Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and ultimately
World War II. In fact, from the very beginning the League‘s
engagement in collective security proved shoddy. The League
always tried to refrain from disputes involving permanent members or
their interests and when it did enter that minefield it failed to be
effective. The League‘s disposition of former German and Ottoman
Empire territories in the form of mandates to major powers effectively
created a market for a new sort of colonialism.

The failures of the League of course are better known. However,
these aside, as Falk notes, the idea of an organized international
community survived World War II and ―the presence of an
institutional center for world politics has not been allowed to
disappear from the international scene.‖43 The League was based on
an idea that was good in essence but its timing was perhaps not
right.

Thus, following the worst carnage of all times in World War II an
international institutional setup was created in the form of the United
Nations, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
the International Monetary Fund. Deals struck in San Francisco and
Bretton Woods came to consolidate an international order which took
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account only partly of the failings of the previous institutional setup
and better reflected the American primacy in world affairs, despite
the bipolar structure that was in the offing. Thus, the seat of the
United Nations and its Security Council was established in New York
with offices also in Geneva and Vienna for specialized agencies, and
the World Bank and IMF based in Washington DC.

When one looks closer the great paradox of the 19th century appears
in

astonishing

perplexity.

Economic

liberalization

continued

throughout this century together with a benign proliferation of
international institutions. Often conceived as a bottom up process,
inspired no doubt by the ideals of the American and French
revolutions of the earlier century, notable individuals took up
internationalist causes that culminated in the creation of such
enduring institutions as the International Committee of the Red Cross
in 1864 and the Universal Postal Union in 1874 and the International
Olympic Committee in 1894. The codification of international law
regarding the treatment of non belligerents in war and settlement of
disputes in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences provided a
befitting ending to an eventful century in which humanity took large
steps forward

in

expanding human

rights

and international

cooperation to sustain peace and prosperity.

Almost simultaneously, the great powers were arming to the teeth,
arms races were raging among navies which were essential
instruments of power projection to colonies and alliances were being
forged. As Paul Kennedy observes, ―the era from 1871 to 1914 was a
bizarre and puzzling one, with great and increasing evidence of
international integration existing side by side with ethnic-nationalist
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passions, warmongering, and social Darwinist notions about the
primacy of struggle.‖44

Thus, the mere establishment of the League was not sufficient to
govern a minimum world order and despite its bases among peace
movements around Europe, the strategic context was not yet ripe for
it to be effective. In fact, the League by virtue of being prematurely
born may have even been counterproductive for world peace. The
expectations created around the League may have contributed to the
abandonment of balance of power strategies to contain the Nazi‘s
expansionism and the League‘s weaknesses further exacerbated the
resolve of Germany, Italy and Japan. The failure to force the return of
Germany, first to the League sponsored disarmament talks and then
to the League itself punched nails on the coffin of peace.
Niall Ferguson, goes to great lengths in the ―War of the World‖ to
demonstrate that World War II could have been prevented or
significantly limited.45 It would be too presumptuous anyway to
consider history fatalistically developing on a predetermined track.
Had the right policies been implemented and World War II averted,
one could argue that the League of Nations despite its flaws would
have survived. Once institutions and orders are created they
regularly become fixations on the stage until the point their demise
becomes inevitable. The League of Nations disbanded in 1946 only
after the San Francisco Treaty established the United Nations.

Hypothesis Four:
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There is no doubt that a world order is shaped by the enduring
interests of the leading actors. This invariably includes the
fundamental aspect of the economic interest. It can also be said
that the body of arrangements and norms that constitute a
world order is also shaped in the mental image of these major
actors. The Power Transition Theory‘s core assumptions about
AFK Organski‘s four types of states (dominant state, great
powers, middle powers and small powers) exerting differential
influences on the evolution of regional and world orders
supports this assertion, although no single dominant state was
observed in modern history, including the United States. The
unipolar moments may have existed and in terms of
concentrations of power attributes unipolarity does exist.
However, power and influence are not congruent and this very
fact has been one dilemma puzzling even frustrating US and
other intellectuals and policy makers alike. That said, historical
experience does bear out the hypothesis that world orders are
shaped by the economic and other interests of the leading
actors.

The world has almost always had certain orders that are
weaved around the leading power or powers of the time and
place. In what Falk calls the ―complacent consensus‖46 the
world order until World War I, or more accurately roughly
between 1648 and 1918, depended on a group of European
―Great Powers‖ striking balance of power among them. The
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world outside Europe was and treated as the periphery. For
every local order outer rims form the periphery. However, this
time around most of the rest of the world was already ruled
directly or indirectly by naval European Empires. Particularly in
the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, while the competition and
violent rivalry continued among the Empires within Europe, their
contests were more intensive in the periphery. And, ultimately
this was part of the logic of the Concert of Europe in which
groupings of European powers strived to enforce international
norms and cooperated to that effect as they reassured that no
single one of them could overpower the rest. This world order
gave birth to the development of a set of generally accepted
international laws, and a certain ad hoc conference or concert
diplomacy.

Economically, the mercantilist policies like the Navigation Acts
in England effectively helped build up skilled industrial
population and shipping industry and ushered in the modern
capitalist system fueled European imperialism. However, as
Industrial

Revolution

started

to

unfold

and

imperialism

progressed, laissez faire policies came to supplant mercantilism
as of late 18th century when the free trade ideas of classical
economists led by Adam Smith won out. The premises of this
European balance of power started to erode as following
unification Germany started to grow incongruently within
Europe and set its sight on the colonial territories or influence
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zones of the other European powers. This coincided with the
decline of the easternmost European Empire, the Ottomans,
which opened further areas for imperial competition. By the time
the European Powers engaged in the Great War the fall of
Eurocentric conceptions of the world had already occurred in
essence as the United States became the largest economy in
the world by the turn of the 20th century. The US was until then
a neutral and isolationist power in the rivalries within Europe.
When Washington finally entered the war the US military power
proved decisive. A certain world order had come to an end
ushering in a new one which included in two non-European
powers, the US and Japan, entering the political and military
centre as they had entered the economic one decades ago.

The world order set out by the Treaty of Versailles included 32
states which ultimately became 63 although only 28 remained
members throughout the lifespan of the organization between
1920 and 1946. The League included members around the
world except Africa. However, the continued Eurocentric nature
of the organization was manifest in the fact that the Council‘s
permanent members included five European countries (France,
Italy, UK, Germany and the Soviet Union) and Japan.

The US already the largest economy before 1914 was the main
benefactor of the result of World War I due to the wealth
accumulated by trading with the belligerent allies. Furthermore, the
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US Senate‘s Nye Committee, which met between 1934 and 1936,
established that the US loaned $2.3 billion to United Kingdom and
allies which would have been lost if Germany won the war. The main
reason why the US entered the war in 1917 was thus to protect
investments in Europe. US entry into World War II also had an
economic backdrop mainly related to Japan‘s obstruction of
American economic access to China and the subsequent US
embargo of oil and steel sales. Despite Senate‘s rejection of the
Treaty of Versailles and thus membership to the League of Nations,
due no less to the personal rivalry between President Wilson and the
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US engaged
actively with Europe throughout the 1920‘s as its exports, imports
and investments rose continually. In the interwar years US
dominated the world economy and when it faced the Great
Depression in 1929 the whole world and with it the international order
went into a tailspin.

The economic dimension of the post World War II order, like the
political

dimension,

consolidated

US

preeminence,

enhanced

multilateral institutionalization and reflected the lessons learned from
past failures. Thus the US Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau, in
opening the international conference of 45 countries held in 1944 in
Bretton Woods , blamed the Great Depression for breeding fascism
and war and asserted that global economic institutions would create
"a dynamic world community in which the peoples of every nation will
be able to realize their potentialities in peace." The post World War II
economic system thus depended on three main pillars. The first pillar
comprised the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The
IMF was tasked to structure the international monetary system in
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order to make sure that exchange rates remained stable. This
standardization of monetary policies would enhance international
trade. After all, the experience with the Great Depression was that
the ailing countries instinctively raised trade barriers which only
worsened the crisis. The IMF would also provide temporary financial
aid to countries that faced difficulty in their balance of payments. The
World Bank or the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, on the other hand, would also assist the development
of

international

trade

by

assisting

the

reconstruction

and

development of territories of members by facilitating the investment
of capital for productive purposes. Together the two Bretton Woods
institutions provide for a multilateral framework to manage economy
and trade the collapse of which was seen to have direct implications
for peace.

The second pillar of the global economic order that was created after
World War II was the institutionalization of US preeminence. The IMF
ensured that values of the national currencies of its members were
pegged to US dollar, and the value of the dollar to gold. This has
consolidated US dollar as the dominant currency medium in
international trade. In 1971, the Nixon administration ended the
convertibility of the dollar into gold. Similarly the US would hold 20%
of the votes at the World Bank, the largest public development body
in the world.

The third pillar was the bilateral US aid to war torn European
economies.

This

started

in

1945

under

various

different

arrangements and between 1948-1951 European Recovery Program
(Marshall Plan) kicked in to bundle and streamline various aid
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schemes and extend some $13 billion (around $100 billion) more in
current dollars.47

The cumulative result was a smashing hit for the US and Europe.
Economic recovery and later surge in Europe and US economic and
financial power went hand in hand. The transatlantic economy, which
brings together the first and the second economies of the world are
inextricably interdependent. There is more European investment in
Texas than U.S. investment in Japan, and European firms own more
than $3.3 trillion worth of U.S. assets.48 The relative weight and thus
importance of the direct investments is likely to change as the
Chinese rise continues. However, the importance of America for
Europe and Europe for American in the economic field will continue
to be essential.

Hypothesis Five:
The ensuing order also rectifies some of the flaws of the previous
generation of orders. The League of Nations upgraded and
institutionalized the Concert of Europe system; UN and its Security
Council built on the Council of the League of Nations empowered
with wider range of authorities to protect peace; the World Trade
Organization did not replace IMF and the World Bank but articulated
and developed its trade promotion functions, and so the list goes.
The subsequent has built on the precedent and in so doing
ameliorated some its shortcomings and flaws.

Hypothesis Six:
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Any world order is also composed of a number of concurrent
economic, political, military; global and regional orders. The
global systemic orders cohabit with regional arrangements that
establish a separate -albeit not incompatible- regional or even
transnational orders. The European Union is the most
advanced example in that regard. NAFTA, OSCE, ASEAN even
Eurocontrol as well as countless regional and subregional
arrangements establish a ―patternistic‖ order that regulates one
or many aspects of international life. Additionally, as the
postcolonial-theorists argue ―there are intimate connections
between the private (e.g. ‗household‘) and the public (e.g.
‗governance‘), the upstairs (e.g. ‗masters‘) and the downstairs
(e.g. ‗servants‘), the insiders (e.g. ‗pure breds‘) and the
outsiders (e.g. ‗hybrids‘), the micro-personal (e.g. ‗sex‘) and the
macro-structural (e.g. ‗power‘).‖49 This truly complicates the
grasp of a world order in truly holistic fashion. Except that the
international order is conceived in mental image of the leading
actors and thus reflect the reigning points of view with regard to
the interrelationships (orders) that exist between different
―worlds‖.

Hypothesis Seven:

Nonetheless, the world orders to date were never truly
universal. The common fallacy is to presume that a ―world‖
order existed during the Cold War or even after. This
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presumption of order would come as a shock to the millions of
dead in the proxy wars or due to hunger all taking place in
areas unregulated by the ―world order‖. The deadlocks in the
UNSC that is tasked to regulate all conflict around the world,
and the conflicts that took place in areas falling out of the zones
of influence of the two opposing blocs, or failures in state
governance in economies falling outside or the darker side of
globalization rendered any order only partial not global.

Hypothesis Eight:

Yet, the trend is towards more and more expansive orders both
in terms of geographical reach and in terms of the multiple
layers of everyday life that the world order arrangements
regulate. The human quest is to extend minimum international
order as comprehensively as possible. Globalization, which is a
beauty and a beast rolled into one, is the main driver. In fact,
globalization is a process by which the world order seems to be
expanding

geographically

and

socio-economically.

That

however is bringing old periphery on par with the old center,
threatening the primacy of the historical center.

Hypothesis Nine:
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At this point I need to introduce another perspective which
returns to the relativity of the world order experience. I have
already proposed that from the perspective of the effect of the
minimum world order it matters whether one is situated within or
outside the areas regulated by the order. A child born in
Rwanda in 1994 has a completely different world order
experience that a child born the same year in Bethesda,
Maryland. Even within the order, it matters whether one is at the
center or at the periphery. The center and periphery as well as
the area governed by world order are inherently in dynamic
evolution. This evolution is by human standards very gradual
and generations long. Globalization however creates a dynamic
by which transitions are hastened. As such some areas have
been set in motion from outside to inside and from the periphery
to the core. Far East as a region and Turkey as a country are
examples to upward mobility within the order. Middle East is an
example to mobility from without to within. For those who are
located in the vicinity of those mobile ―units‖ change is an
altogether robust concept. If the regional order around you is
under pressure, despite all that globalization has done to shrink
distances in a flat and global village, geographical proximity, as
geography itself, matters a great deal.

Hypothesis Ten:
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Last but definitely not least, rises and falls of world orders do
not happen in a deterministic fashion. If the last hundred years
were the American century this is not only due to US rise but
also the dramatic European decline. The speed and totality with
which the latter occurred is not due to American rise but rather
to the a multiplicity of reasons including human error. Just as
history was not a sequence of preordained phenomena, the
future will also not be that. Therefore, what will shape the future
is not only whether and how other powers will rise but also how
the US will decline.
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IV

SENESCENT AND NASCENT WORLD ORDERS

When I put the aforementioned hypotheses together, a
coherent model of change may emerge. I call my model of a
symbiotic and evolutionary experience the mutual existence of
senescent and nascent world orders. The paragraphs below
chart the contours of the outbound (senescent) and the inbound
(nascent) world systems.

The current world order was shaped since late 19th century
when Europe was beginning its decline, the US was quickly
rising, Ottomans were dissolving, and much of the rest of the
world except Japan was largely colonized. The world order in
which we live has been a product of insufferable pain inflicted
by humans on humans, world wars, economic and political
collapses, and environmental degradation. This order has also
engendered for the people who lived within its broadening
center immeasurable prosperity, stability and progress.

A marked characteristic of both the senescent and nascent
world orders is globalization. It is hard to find a conclusive
definition of globalization as scholars seem to disagree on the
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scale and causation, as well as development, impact, and
policy results of this phenomenon. There is disagreement even
on the historical trajectory and chronology of globalization
although there seems to a consensus on the point that in the
past half century globalization has intensified. The journey
might be traced back to the Islamic Golden Age, when traders
and explorers from Muslim lands have established a ―global‖
links expanding trade, scientific and social interactions across
the known world. The Silk Road later further advanced this
integration. The territorial and particularly maritime expansion of
Europeans into new continents also culminated in the discovery
and colonization of America. The first multinational corporation,
The Dutch East India Company, helped cultivate globalization
as a business strategy in the 17th century. During the 19th
century globalization was a fact of life through intensive
international trade and investment between European imperial
powers, their colonies and the United States. These links
continually expanded to include sub-Saharan Africa and the
Island Pacific. A world economic order was thus being created.
The experience of protectionism during the 1930‘s depression
engendered deliberative planning to promote international
economic integration and trade liberalization. By then China
had also entered the world economic system. It is hard to
negate Noam Chomsky‘s assertion that globalization is
beneficial to its designers: Multinational corporations and the
powerful states to which they are closely linked. However, as
capital became more multinational and its operations and
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investments geographically widespread, globalization also
came to empower the target markets.

Anthony Giddens offers a particularly insightful definition of
globalization ―as the intensification of worldwide social relations
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings
are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice
versa.‖50 This emphasis on ―social relations‖ more accurately
depicts the multilayered impact of globalization. Thus it is no
longer about a powerful country sapping the natural resources
of a weaker one and trading the processed goods back to the
initial producer of the natural resource. The interaction is
profusely and intimately social including political. The vector of
the relationship continues to flow more from the powerful
towards the weaker but it is no longer one directional. The
expansion of globalization is therefore no longer merely
economic expansion. It is also cultural, sociological, political
and even psychological. Values and institutions are passed on
as much as goods and capital. As such the reach of the world
order is congruous with the reach of the multiple layers of
globalization. A country that is fully within the world order is
protected to a large degree against the torrents of being
excluded. That is the zone of modernity, prosperity, liberty, and
security. That is the first world. A country starts entering the
globalized world order when it starts benefiting from the
governing arrangements and adopting some of the economic,
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political, institutional fabrics worn in the first world. This includes
democratization,
accountability,

constitutionalism,
collective

security,

rule
free

of

the

trading,

law,

financial

liberalization including through stock exchanges and the like. I
will use this explanation in the remainder of this essay when
talking about countries and regions in or out of step with the
world order.

The aging and rising world orders are cohabiting, one caving in,
the other moving in. The following is an admittedly bird‘s eye
view of the general contours of this asynchronous process or
phenomenon.

President Lula of Brazil at the G-7 Summit held in Evian in 2003
reportedly said: ―Gentlemen, I would like to suggest to you that
next year maybe you would like to meet in Brazil to get yourself
ready for 20 years from now when 5 of you will not be here.
Because you should understand that in that period of time, 20
or 30 years from now, the number one country in the world will
be China, number two will be the United States, number three
will be India, number four will be Japan, and I regret to say that
none of the rest of you will be here. I'll be here,' he said. 'But it
would still be nice to have you around, so come get used to the
developing

world.‖51

What

President

Lula‘s

intervention

whimsically underscored was that the power structure of the
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world is under change and this is creating a new reality that will
be recognized in due course.

The fundamental actors are the hyper power US, which is at the
top of the global power structure, but may have reached the
peak of its power potential; Europe which despite its painful and
long decline still belongs at the top layer of the global power
scala thanks to the EU, but is seriously lacking vision and
direction. Discovering that vision and also admitting Turkey is
likely to replenish the EU‘s potential to hang on to its position
within the top layer. Together, the US and Europe form the top
of the global power structure in almost every way. They also
make up three of the five permanent posts in the worlds top
multinational (or even supranational except for the permanent
members) global organ, namely the UN Security Council. That
Europe is not represented by a single seat at this forum is a
relic of the war of half a century ago.

After having amassed attributes of power that no other mortal
power has been able to assemble, the US has entered a
relative stagnation the course and result of which is yet to be
seen. That said, US will continue to be the dominant global
power during the lifetime of anyone alive on this day. Obviously,
US power cannot be easily matched although the EU has
already superseded American economic power. In the military
realm, Washington spends almost half of the entire global
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defense expenditures. The US defense budget is exceeds the
combined spending of the next 46 countries. The US spends six
times more than China, 10 times more than Russia and no less
than 99 times than Iran. All the potential US rivals put together
spend some $205 billion annually that is little over one third of
US defense expenditures. However, even these numbers do
not show the full picture. If one adds the defense expenditures
of NATO allies, Japan, South Korea and Australia one reaches
over 70% of all military spending in the world. One ought also to
consider that all of the top ten defense companies in the world
are from NATO countries. In terms of strategic culture, the US is
accustomed to its leadership role and its elites are not likely to
give up this position. The Obama administration is no
exception. Furthermore, the current economic crisis can even
produce the effect of a certain cleansing of the financial system
thereby mitigating or even halting long term US economic
decline. The financial crisis in Turkey in 2001 had exactly this
sort of effect rendering Turkish economy one of the fastest
growing in the world. The counter example of course is Japan
which has not been able yet to recover fully since 1997.
Whether the effect of the current crisis on the fate of the world‘s
leading superpower will be along the Turkish or Japanese
examples will have to be watched and seen.

Russia is no longer the top contender against these two
powers, but it has every resource to be on the rise and is thus
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considered to be part of the BRIC. Russia‘s influence is
curtailed by the loss of its political appeal but it is using its
position in the energy market to recover ground lost since the
end of the Cold War. It has also launched an open challenge
against US-European primacy by attacking Georgia and
recognizing the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from
Georgia. However, Russia is a systemic power in almost every
other field.

China, like Russia, already belongs in the post World War II top
layer of the global power structure including by virtue of its
UNSC permanent membership. However, it is currently forming
the second layer together with Russia. China is careful in not
openly launching an anti-systemic challenge to the US primacy
although it is not shy in drawing its own redlines including in
Taiwan and Nepal. China is a major benefactor of globalization
and thus far has been particularly lucky in staving off its
inevitable challenges and problems.

I have essentially recounted the UN Security Council‘s five
existing permanent members which is illustrative of which
countries the current world order, as an institutional global
compact, has codified as the top powers. Clearly, this list is not
totally representative of what actually forms the top of the power
chain. Although all the listed powers are in the actual top layer,
there are others which exert significant leverage. In a recent
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study the Stanley Foundation concluded that ten countries will
form the top layer of the global major powers layer. These are
the US, EU, Turkey, South Africa, Russia, India, China, South
Korea, Japan. Obviously, this list is subject to debate. For
instance, it takes for granted that Turkey will remain outside the
EU. However, with perhaps a few additions the list also reflects
more or less a general consensus as to the top achievers in the
world. If that scenario is realized, it would have ramifications for
the global economic, political, institutional structures.
It is interesting to note that at first side, leaving aside Russia‘s
indecision, all the actors are in fact conforming to the global
order that is shaped under the US lead. All act within the
system, protect it, try to improve its position within the system,
and aim to reform it without jeopardizing its fundamental
parameters. They also show reflexes that try to keep the US
within the order that US itself has pioneered. Furthermore, all of
these powers shun the prospect of armed conflict between
them. It can be said that the domestic dynamics of these
countries, the type of the relationship that they will develop
among them and how they would related to their close
neighborhoods will be important from the perspective of the
evolution of the coming world order.

The reason why all the current and likely future major powers
appear to support the current world order could be mainly
economic. First of all being an anti-systemic power is
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unbearably expensive even for a country like China that holds
around $2 trillion in reserves. Secondly, all these powers rise by
benefiting from the current world order albeit in different
degrees. Thirdly, the level of interdependence among US and
China is such that historian Neill Ferguson talks about a
Chinamerica, which smacks of Brzezinski‘s one time Amerippon
idea. At any rate, a version of the nuclear strategic doctrine of
Mutual Assured Destruction that formed the underlying logic of
the US-Soviet balance during the Cold War is probably now
applicable in the economic domain between China and
America, which can shatter each other‘s economies.

The critical coefficient in the evolution of power structures will
be not only how the BRIC‘s and the N-11 nations will manage
their rise but also how the US will cope with the idea of a set of
friendly or rival powers gradually closing the gap. The case of
China‘s rise is particularly noteworthy although by no means the
only challenge to the US pre-eminence. The power transition
theoreticians show that under conditions of parity among two
contending powers, if the challenger is dissatisfied, the
probability of war increases dramatically.52 Yet, for all intents
and purposes, the reality may be more complex and involve not
a ―war‖ as such but a sustained and multifaceted global
political, economic and even cultural struggle. This may happen
even when what Ronald Tammen calls the ―harmonization of
elites‖ is realized and when the ―elite ruling class ... is satisfied
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with the international structure and the corresponding rules of
the road.‖53 The current economic crisis has reconfirmed that
the US and China have joint stakes in maintaining the current
global system although China will surely have a number of
amendments to seek and gradually it will grow more assertive
in pursuit of what it sees as its national interest. However, near
parity would also mean having to go through Beijing in every
issue which the US, nor any other major power, is likely to
tolerate. And, there will be many willing smaller actors that
would likely play one power against the other.

Needless to say, acting against the system is risky given that it
would spark not only US but also the fellow small and large
powers‘ potential resistance. Therefore, a free trading capitalist
system has been anchored along the US-EU-China-India-Brazil
axis and this forms the infrastructure of the evolving world
order.

This

economic

system

will

likely

see

specific

amendments but will probably be resilient in its basic form
beyond the horizon. However, there is already an old tension
resurfacing between state control and the market this time with
stronger vigor on the part of the proponents of state control.

On the one side is the astounding achievement of the private
business in the world. The free market has produced a dramatic
reorientation of the power relationship between the nation state
and the private enterprise. In our day and age the US defense
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budget is only half of the annual sales of two companies,
Walmart and ExxonMobil. The latter‘s annual sales is
approximately on par with the GDP of the 19th largest economy
in the world. Top 250 companies have annual earnings that
form one third of the global GDP. One third of all assets in the
world are controlled by the top 50 financial institutions. There
are around 100 companies that have sales worth over $50
billion whereas only 60 nation states have GDP of similar
power.54 Private business is a powerful force. Ian Bremmer
points out that the free market tide has receded: ―Across the
United States, Europe, and much of the rest of the developed
world, the recent wave of state interventionism is meant to
lessen the pain of the current global recession and restore
ailing economies to health. For the most part, the governments
of developed countries do not intend to manage these
economies indefinitely. However, an opposing intention lies
behind similar interventions in the developing world: there the
state's heavy hand in the economy is signaling a strategic
rejection of free-market doctrine.‖55

The 13 largest oil companies in the world, which Bremmer
measures by their reserves, are owned and operated by
governments. He thus argues that state capitalism in which the
state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets
primarily for political gain is replacing free market policies. And,
that signals a global competition not among rival political
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ideologies but between competing economic models. This
observation is interesting yet not necessarily novel. The free
market has always been in tension with the state. What may be
new is that the global economic crisis has increased this
tension and created a backlash against neoliberalism also in
the US and European markets. Therefore, Bremmer is right
from his point of view in taking the nation-states‘ resurgence in
the

economic

field

seriously,

because

that

trend

can

fundamentally influence economic policies and balances and
thus the future place of private business in world order.
However, the political dimension of the tension between state
and private business can be equally if not more fundamentally
important and game changing.

The main ideology that supports the current world order is
shaped by liberal or even neoliberal economy that promotes
global access over national boundaries, social and individual
freedoms that encourage creativity and skilled migration, and
multi party democracy and rule of law regimes which maintain
stability and facilitate resolution of differences within a society
with other means than physical violence. Following the end of
the Cold War and the demise of the rivaling ideological model,
the idea of global governance has gathered increasing
momentum. The principle and structures of global governance
and globalization are mutually supportive. In this picture, just as
there is the issue of state control over economy, there has
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always been a comparable tension between state control and
individual liberties. For at least a few generations it will not be
realistic to expect China, Russia and scores of other countries
to adopt a Western style liberal and pluralistic democratic
political model.

That will have at least three implications: Firstly, an ideology is
ultimately only as powerful as the body in which it can insert
itself. Read in reverse, whatever ideological model powerful
countries adopt will find its admirers in other countries. A state
controlled market economy, global trade liberalism matched
with enlightened illiberal policies at home may well be an
alternative model for a significant portion of the world.
Variations of this model is likely to compete with Western
models around the world and especially in countries that are
outside the inner ring of the global order. Secondly, the liberal
model has an evangelical tendency which would add tension to
relations with countries which resist political liberalization. The
colored revolutions of the 2000‘s have significantly soured the
perceptions in Russia, Egypt and scores of other countries
against the West which was suspected of instigating these
popular movements. Thirdly, demands for liberal approaches
will limit the reach of the West and ideas and values associated
with it. The US has yet to invite the leader of Turkmenistan to
Washington for an official visit despite the overwhelming
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interests in forging good relations with this key energy security
player.

As I have explained, geopolitical shifts are underway both in
terms of the configuration of the biggest powers that take
leading roles in defining and upholding world order and those
who remain outside the relatively stable order. At the same
time, there are shifts that are ideational. This relates to a
dynamic already unleashed that pulls away from the only
remaining comprehensive and successful economic, political
and social governance model, which finds its ideal form in
neoliberalism. The ―only course, no alternative‖ approach
underlying the ―end of history‖ thesis is now strongly contested
around the world.

However, this reaction to neoliberal, pro-globalization and world
governance

policies

remain

sporadic,

disorganized

and

incoherent both intellectually and organizationally. How long it
would take for this underlying opposition to find its wholesome
ideological voice and example can only be guessed not
foreseen. There is every reason to believe that China‘s
economic success is already producing ripples that as long as
China continues its rise will attract increasing proponents and
advocates as well as theoreticians.
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A process may already be underway in which liberal
democracy-free

market

economy

nexus

supporting

globalization is strongly contested at the popular level. The
violent street protests are a common sideshow to the high level
gatherings of the world‘s prosperous and powerful nations.
These however do not as yet form a coherent whole and
include a diversity of viewpoints including nihilists and
anarchists. As Paul Rogers notes: ―The aspiration to what might
be called the internationalisation of dissent has not yet been
fully realised. But there are more than glimpses of the
phenomenon in social, environmental and workers' movements
- reflecting the fact that one result of globalization is the much
wider

understanding

of

the

transnational

nature

of

marginalization and exclusion. There is every chance that the
early 2010s will indeed see the rise of fully transnational antielite movements triggered by wholesale deprivation, fuelled by
anger, and armed with the hunger for an inclusive and just
world. In time, they may be as or even more potent than the
anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 1960s.‖56 In fact, the
very formula that is touted as the agent for the transformation of
the world into prosperous, peaceful, liberal and civic minded
global community may just not be working that way.

Amy Chua argues for example that ―the global spread of
markets and democracy is a principal aggravating cause of
group hatred and ethnic violence throughout the non-Western
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world.‖57 Scores of people who thrived within the system
including such prominent names the Nobel laureate Joseph
Stiglitz and George Soros criticize the process of globalization
and seek to reform it. The idea of social justice and social
security are once again in ascendancy. It remains to be seen
whether the social democratic movements, long puzzled by the
strength and vigor of neoliberalism, may regroup and find a
discourse befitting the current realities. They would be in search
of such a discourse that would channel some of the popular
discontent into a positive and non-destructive political agenda
that also safeguards democracy and economic opportunity.
Obviously, these are not developments that China can inspire,
but the message here is that the stuttering of neoliberalism is
likely to challenge more liberalism as a panacea against all ills
and create an ideational fracture.
Whether the ideational fractures will lead to institutional
consequences is a question worth asking. It is hardly so that the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) led by China and
Russia or the Collective Security Treaty Organization lead by
Russia amount to an organized illiberal front or even aspire to
that. Their main focus is security and although the CSTO
occasionally makes rather exaggerated self comparisons to
NATO it simply is not in the same league. The Shanghai
Cooperation

Organization

deserves

greater

attention.

Comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan the SCO dates back to 1996. Its original
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purpose was to establish confidence and help demilitarize
China-Soviet Union border. Its focus and visibility have been
increasing in recent years. The SCO has no economic
dimension and its political dimension is currently secondary to
its security focus. Even on the latter front the level of integration
of the SCO is rather limited. The organization in 2005 openly
called for US to end its military bases in Central Asia. The SCO
is not an organization that can be overlooked and history is
replete with examples of nucleus organizations eventually
sprawling and assuming additional tasks and missions.
However, the strength of the SCO, namely having China and
Russia as members, is also its potential weakness. The real
world may just be too complicated with these two giants to
demonstrate a lasting common front.

On the other side, of course there are powerful and well
established western led institutions already in place. The prime
example is the NATO which is exclusively Europe and America
and not global in membership. But, the idea is already out to
develop an institutional framework that would transcend
geographical limits and be based on ideological orientation.
Although not the best example because of its different intention,
Anne Bayefsky of the Hudson Institute called for a United
Democratic

Nations,

―an

international

organization

of

democracies, by democracies, and for democracies‖ to replace
the ineffective United Nations.58 More to the point is the work by
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the Princeton Project on National Security under the lead of
John Ikenberry and Anne Marie Slaughter, which called for the
creation of a Concert of Democracies.

The proposed Concert of Democracies would work towards the
institutionalization of democratic peace. Thus, ―if the United
Nations cannot be reformed, the Concert would provide an
alternative forum for liberal democracies to authorize collective
action, including the use of force, by a supermajority vote. Its
membership would be selective, but self-selected. Members
would have to pledge not to use or plan to use force against
one another; commit to holding multiparty, free-and-fair
elections at regular intervals; guarantee civil and political rights
for their citizens enforceable by an independent judiciary; and
accept the responsibility to protect.‖59 Thus, the Princeton
Project‘s 2006 report Forging A World of Liberty Under Law:
U.S. National Security in the 21st Century also argued that
America would be safer, more prosperous and healthier if
governments

around

the

world

were

more

popular,

accountable, and rights regarding; if existing international
institutions were reformed and new ones created to reflect
liberal principles; and if the role of force was reconsidered in
light of the threats of the 21st century. In the 2008 US elections
Republican candidate John McCain also espoused a League of
Democracies.
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While not carrying much wind currently it should be seen totally
within the realm of the probable that these ideas resurface also
in the near future. They may even form the nucleus of the
thinking behind the institutional makeup of the next world order
either as a replacement to the United Nations, as the
proponents on the left and right seem to suggest, or as a
complement to it. Either way, another element of the senescent
and the nascent world orders is again probably alive today.

This brings up the issue of the institutions of the current and
next world order. The power, ideological and economic
foundations

of

the

world

order

are

protected

by

a

comprehensive network of international organizations, which
have been updated in due course. This network has the UN and
UNSC, Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, NATO, and
from another angle EU and ASEAN. All of those should be
expected to remain beyond the horizon but go through minimal
reform,

minimal

in

the

sense

that

barring

complete

disintegration, the necessary far reaching reforms will be
politically unachievable.

Institutions obviously do shape the environment. However,
more importantly international law and multinational structures
are formed by the codification of what already exists or can
exist. This codification is achieved in close proximity to the
common denominators and under the lead of the dominant
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power or powers. For the future institutional makeup a number
of questions about the future nature of international relations
should first find their answers. These include whether the US is
prepared to share power or resist; whether ascendant actors
will engage in attritive and/or violent struggles among them or
with others; how the medium and smaller size countries will
relate to the regional major powers; how a possible antisystemic ―revolutionary circumstance‖ in a major power would
impact on the global system and other major powers. Under an
optimistic scenario, the current world order may expand beyond
current overrepresentation of the West to bring China and India
but also potentially Turkey and other key states more into the
decision shaping and decision making positions within the
international organizations. At any rate, there is little doubt the
future global institutions would be based on much more power
sharing between America, Europe and Eastern Eurasia.

That is certainly the case with regard to the so-called Bretton
Woods institutions. Since the Nixon administration severed the
dollar-gold parity in 1971, the biggest reform drive may actually
be approaching the IMF and the World Bank. This should
involve more appropriate representation of the emerging
powers like China, India, Brazil and Turkey. Similarly, a new
revenue model would be required to secure new lasting sources
of revenues without levying additional burden on the indebted
countries whose interest payments help sustain the IMF. But of
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equal importance may be the criticism that these institutions
have failed to promote development. The recipes advanced by
the IMF and the World Bank could be revised.

A process holding particular institutional promise is the G-20
which represents the world‘s leading economies. The Group
was established in 1999 with the purpose of promoting the
integration of the major emerging economies into dialogue with
the G-7 countries comprising the most developed, namely the
US, Germany, Japan, UK, France, Italy and Canada. The G-20
format thus includes all the G-7 countries, Russia (which is a
member of G-8 for broader political interactions), and Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey, as well as the EU. The
G-20 between 1999 and 2008 met annually at the level and
within the mandate areas of the national finance ministers as
well as central bank representatives. This group of twenty
leading economies has been energized at the Heads of State
and Government level by the US in November 2008 in order to
create a broad global platform to tackle the current economic
crisis. The G-20 did indeed make a good start in that regard
when it pulled together a trillion dollars in support of the IMF
when it met for the second time at the Summit level in London
in April 2009. The Group also led the way to reform global
financial management by calling for the regulation of hedge
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funds and other means of shadow banking system that defied
any control despite the trillions of dollars under their belt.

However, for the G-20 to reach its full potential it needs to be
conceived not only as a financial gathering but as a global
political-economic forum that supports minimum world order
and helps harmonize national policies of the twenty leading
powers in the world. The G-20 rather than G-8 or any version of
it is the institution of the future. However, in the meantime there
will be reactionary inertia to hold on to the obsolescent G-8 or
circumspect G-7 plus 5 (BRIC) frameworks as agreed at the G7‘s Heiligendam meeting. Here again the rule of redundancy
until death is likely to apply because of the lack of zeal to end
what is outdated and put in place that whose time has come.
On the international security side, a critical question is whether
it is possible to return from the current point where the erosion
of the nuclear non proliferation regimes is a reality. Henry
Kissinger at a speech referred to this question: ―If proliferation is
not stopped now, it will project us into a world that will become
morally and strategically unmanageable. There will be too many
countries with nuclear weapons with too many varied
incentives. We are reaching a point where we are running out of
time, and we have to be honest with ourselves. What price are
we willing to pay to stop an Iranian nuclear weapons
program? Failing that, how do we propose to organize a world
of rampant proliferation?‖60 Although the emphasis on Iran is
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obvious, the question is more diffuse and profound. The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is actually premised on the
eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons and President
Obama has referred to the zero option. That is probably not
achievable. There is a realistic chance that a gradual if long
slide may occur towards a world where nuclear proliferation is
accepted and regulated to the extent possible by potentially
new instruments. However, it is also likely that in the process
several countries which have nuclear weapon ambitions face
serious problems, one or two even military interventions.

The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is already continuing its
existence thanks to the life support it receives from numerous
other nuclear non proliferation agreements, such as the Nuclear
Supplier Group and several others. It is also around because it
is basically impossible to negotiate anything new that would
adequately answer the call with regard to how the nuclear
monster is to be restrained.

NATO is the most impressive military alliance in history. If the
US is the predominant military hyperpower that is unique in
history, NATO is even more than that. It is among the the most
successful post-World War II constructs. This organization is
however perennially mired in debate about its relevancy. Since
the 1960‘s when this questioning first began, NATO has
continued its existence and even expanded its base of
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operations. This is an alliance which binds the first and the
second ranking economies of the world together in a one for all,
all for one treaty. There is no other defence community and
organization that fulfils that function. Whatever the possible
scenarios for the future of global governance and the place of
cooperative security arrangements within world order, NATO‘s
alternative does not as yet exist. The same cannot be said for
the EU foreign and security policy whose meaningful existence
is strictly contingent upon its liaison to NATO. That said EU‘s
civilian crisis management capabilities are form niche and the
most important security contributions to the world. One would
be safe to assume that NATO will undergo reforms and
transformations, but these will fall short of what is necessary
and instead will reflect what is politically and bureaucratically
possible. But, it will stick around into the next world order
although the currently faltering mission to stabilize Afghanistan,
obviously in which NATO is just one player along others and
particularly the UN, poses a further risk to how the Alliance is
perceived among its constituent peoples.

The main natural resources supporting world order are
hydrocarbons, mainly oil but increasingly natural gas; as well as
uranium that is needed for nuclear energy. This is likely to
continue for at least two more human generations. In the
meantime, alternative energy resources will rapidly enter the
field. The transition will not be abrupt but gradual. A new divide
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will emerge between the states which lead and fall behind in
investing in the development of future energy resources and
generation means. It is now widely accepted that the next world
order‘s energy and production base will have to be green (and
blue). The future energy base will also be more technology
intensive and distributed and utilized through more integrated
and efficient networks. At any rate, as Jared Diamond explains
in Collapse and Thomas Friedman in Hot, Flat and Crowded,
the American model of development that is ecologically
destructive is now implemented in China but it is not globally
sustainable. The efforts to detract attention and focus from the
impending global environmental catastrophes are not only
counter factual but also inexcusably immoral.

On the other hand, although the initial American experience
with oil and the propelling effect it had on American takeoff tells
otherwise, ultimately it is more essential to have access to
energy resources and technologies than to own them. This is
particularly true for countries which are vulnerable to foreign
interventions and have feeble political structures. Oil is now the
curse of a good deal of countries. Nuclear energy should also
be expected to see a boost despite the potential negative
implications for non proliferation. Even in the optimistic scenario
of the world order‘s transformation without a major war, the
turmoil will continue within and with regard to areas that will not
be able to adjust to globalization. This also means that fierce
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struggles will continue over natural resources including water.
Areas that have been intentionally left outside contest, such as
Antarctica, space, oceans and their beds are likely to face
increasing competition.

Geopolitics is therefore back with a vengeance. As Robert
Kaplan aptly describes: ―rather than eliminating the relevance of
geography, globalization is reinforcing it. Mass communications
and economic integration are weakening many states, exposing
a Hobbesian world of small, fractious regions. Within them,
local, ethnic, and religious sources of identity are reasserting
themselves, and because they are anchored to specific terrains,
they are best explained by reference to geography. Like the
faults that determine earthquakes, the political future will be
defined by conflict and instability with a similar geographic logic.
The upheaval spawned by the ongoing economic crisis is
increasing the relevance of geography even further, by
weakening social orders and other creations of humankind,
leaving the natural frontiers of the globe as the only restraint.‖
At any rate the order of globalization is expanding inexorably
towards the areas it has little touched. Globalization with its
economic, political, social and institutional precepts must to
expand. And, that expansion is not a bad thing. However the
transition is not easy.
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Remaining out of the system is the default position the inertia of
which is hard to beat. However, the cost of staying out is far too
heavier for the countries concerned and the world at large. The
geopolitics of world order expansion will have significantly
diverse effects on the countries involved. Some will successfully
adapt and prosper, while several others will likely be squeezed
under

failing

state

structures,

economic

and

social

backwardness, and external interventions. Overall, as before,
also in the future, staying out will be significantly more costly
than accomplishing transfer towards the center. However, this
geopolitics can also be tricky for the major powers. India and
China are already competing in the Indian Ocean. Other races
should be expected around the world. Historically, the process
of pulling in China into the global economic market and the USJapanese competition around 1917 produced deep shocks,
even entry of the US into a World War.

In our day and age, four regions in particular will be subject to
strong currents and potentially shocks of globalization. These
are Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan; former Soviet Union‘s non-EU
territories; former Ottoman Empire‘s Middle Eastern territories;
Africa.

Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan are situated in between major
powers of the future and straddle key strategic resources or
geo-strategic junctures. They are also grappling with anti91

systemic movements that obstruct their change of tack towards
the tight jacket of globalization and face significant violence
potential. Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state, whereas Iran is
progressing on that path. Although the dynamics in Afghanistan
and Pakistan have come to show significant convergence, Iran
is a separate issue in its own right. The future position of these
three countries in any global or regional order will be the result
of a major and trend setting struggle.

The countries that broke away from the Soviet Union were once
part of a bloc that aspired to shape the world order in its own
image. Since the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet
Union those that were lucky to be the neighbors of the
European Union were pulled into the Union and the tranquility
of the globalized world order. This involved speedy enactment
of reforms to make their governance more compatible with the
rest of the Union. Europe acted decisively and rapidly to tie
them in within both the EU and NATO, thus ensuring American
guarantee over their place within the West, which Europe alone
could not and would not venture. The small size of these
countries also helped significantly in dissolving the ancien
regime and adoption of a completely new set of political and
economic fabric.

Those farther away from the EU and those which could not
show the necessary resolve and sense of direction were not
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that lucky. Russia as the center of the old regional order also
could not carry through its own reforms and maintained a half in
and half out presence on the margins of both the EU and China.
The Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia as well
as all Central Asian Republics will be facing strong currents
pulling them in all directions. Given the strong interests of
Russia, Turkey, EU, US and China, including in terms of energy
security, the future positioning of the countries of this basin
stretching from Ukraine to Kazakhstan will be shaped by strong
tremors.

The broader Middle East is mostly the parts of the former
Ottoman Empire that have remained behind in adapting to a
regional and world order. The region displays the scars of the
fact that the Major Powers failed to agree on what regional
order would best reflect their interests. The design failed
miserably also thanks to the fact that the Turkish War of
Independence and the ensuing Ataturk reforms disrupted the
model where a subservient and much weakened regional
foreman would maintain a pithy minimum order subject to the
direction and manipulation of the stronger external powers.
Lausanne Treaty of 1923 defeated this design mainly pushed
by the earlier Treaty of Sevres. What Ankara proved then was
that no viable regional order can be established that would not
take Turkey into account. But, Turkey itself could not impose an
order either. Oil complicated the efforts to establish a benign
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order as did the failure to incorporate the reality of Israel into
regional thinking.

Initially the League of Nations, in the wake of the failure of the
Sevres design, struggled to regulate the competition of the
World War I victors through mandates. In the wake of World
War II, the countries of this region ran about without any
coherent sense of direction behind different politico-economic
models. They could not overcome the fractures among them.
They developed a pattern of vacillation between authoritative
regimes and opposition movements either detached from local
realities or bereft of comprehensive and viable governance
models.

The US primacy also could not translate into a substantive US
control of regional dynamics and did not engender a
transformation that would help the region embark on a journey
towards adopting the precepts of globalization. In nearly a
century since the collapse of Pax Ottomanica, no stable order
could have been established to replace the Ottoman order.
Instead, the region is mired in conflict, backwardness,
authoritarianism, extremism, and external manipulation and
intervention. The US efforts since 1990‘s to apply the example
of Eastern Europe in this region intensified in the wake of
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and produced ventures
such as the invasion of Iraq and the Broader Middle East
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initiatives, which are different in content and approach. In fact,
the victory of Hamas in 2006 Palestinian elections has resulted
in an upset for the US-led efforts. A new status has been
created in Iraq the future of which is yet uncertain. And, Iran
has been isolated as the only remaining point of resistance,
except of course the resilient non state actors, and tightly put in
a bind or potentially on a collision course. That said there is
currently no lasting dynamic that would force liberalization and
democratization of politics and economy and modernization of
the social structures; except the example of Turkey.

This

region which has been resisting all change expects strong
quakes in the near future.

Post-colonial Africa is almost entirely out of step with
globalization. It is instead enmeshed all in but name within a
deal that is but a leftover of their colonial past. However, the
fact of the matter is that these are now independent countries
with resources and the continent has new players including
China and the US entering the field in addition to the lingering
Europeans. The strongest naval power in the Indian Ocean and
an emerging major power India should also be seen within this
context. The competition over Africa will be more intense in
comparison to the colonization experience of the last two
centuries. Difficult times may indeed be ahead for the continent
whose local progressive dynamics are scattered and as yet
underdeveloped.
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V

BACK TO REMARRYING
SCHOLARSHIP WITH POLICY

Assessing how theory helps specific policy is a domain which
the academia treats as voluntary. What does all of the above
mean for a practitioner of international relations? Understanding
the

logic,

direction,

dynamics,

protagonists,

restraints,

opportunities and perils of change, needless to say, are
important on their own right. Setting priorities and assessing
policy options could not, or rather should not, start before that
exercise is first made in any detail.

In this regard, major theories all have a perspective but are
ultimately of little help in their individuality. Realism appears to
be most popular throughout the world but taken at face value it
would only help freeze innovative thinking at the local level to
mitigate the security dilemmas and the ultimately fragile nature
of

the

international

law

and

institutions.

Institutional

neoliberalism help bring in the policy options of multilateral
organizations including local ones which can go a long way in
preserving the interests and aggrandizing the voice of medium
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and smaller sized countries. Yet, they fall short in accounting for
the possible disruptive and destructive influences of neoliberal
policies

on bodies

that are alien

to such constructs.

Constructivists help by highlighting the fact that interests and
organizing principles can and do often change potentially
opening up new vistas in overcoming some ardent regional
conflicts (although that aspect is grossly under researched by
the constructivists). But, they fail to take into account the fact
that there are probably some primordial reflexes that cannot be
reprogrammed but only contained or channeled including ethnic
conflict when circumstances for a flare-up exist. Some theories
are too narrow, some too vague, some completely misleading
(sorry Mr. Huntington), some even outright morally challenged.
The basket holds a colorful and rich fruit salad. The diversity of
the basket is contingent on one‘s own position on the global
map.

All theoretical paradigms are useful in their own way. They are
also inadequate. Stephen Walt argues that academics need to
make policy relevant suggestions. These suggestions are likely
to

have

the

same

shortcomings

as

the

theoretical

underpinnings they are based on. That is not a dilemma
peculiar to academics. Every policy maker also has a
theoretical lens although pragmatism is the predominant mode
for most. Then, theory and practice are bound by the same
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problem of not being able to predict the future or design futureproof models.

Earlier in this essay I have argued that a common ground
between scholarship and practice exists on three platforms,
namely in shared baseline tasks of data collection and
assessment; Policy Planning as an analysis and synthesis
oriented bureaucratic platform; and think-tanks which aspire to
influence policy through their policy recommendations.

I will therefore now turn to think tanks and policy planning from
the viewpoint of facilitating synergy between scholarship and
practice based on data assessment and policy advice.
a. Think Tanks

Think Tank is a broad and sweeping term. These are
organizations, usually non-profit, which characteristically have
significant research arms. Typically, they produce publications,
organize lectures, hold conferences, provide experts to testify in
parliamentary committees and give media interviews. In the
Anglo-American model at least on paper they are not
associated with any political party. This is to receive tax-exempt
status in Canada and the US. In Germany all major political
parties also have a foundation, basically a policy and advocacy
think tank, attached to them. At any rate, in reality, think tanks
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can be ideologically driven. As Sharon Orr writes, ―Over time
the boundary between objective policy evaluations, a traditional
think tank activity, and policy advocacy have become blurred as
think tanks have become increasingly involved in lobbying
government.‖
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Think tanks do policy analysis and can be a

fertile source of policy ideas. They also generate or popularize
new ones. Sharon Orr divides think tanks into three general
categories, two of which are ―contract research‖ and ―advocacy‖
oriented think tanks. Leaving aside the advocacy organizations,
the clientele for the contract research oriented think tanks are
governments and the objective and task oriented studies they
produce may or may not be available to public. These
organizations employ researchers with diverse backgrounds
including varying academic qualifications.

The third type Orr identifies is closer to our topic. Thus the
―Universities

without

students‖

as

research-oriented

organizations produce policy analyses that usually offer
forward-looking

policy

recommendations.

Their

staff

is

composed mainly of academically trained scholars. The output
includes books and articles in scholarly publications. Their
research is academically rigorous and often long term rather
than reactive to current events. Orr observes: ―although of an
academic bent, their work is distinct from that of most university
research because the first priority is on policy-oriented work,
rather than the theoretically oriented work typical of most
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university researchers. Universities without students are also
less likely to publish in the academic refereed journals preferred
by university scholars. Their research also tends to include at
least some prescriptive policy suggestions, unlike most
university research.‖62

Chistopher DeMuth right before stepping down as President of
the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) gave some interesting
insights into the mind-set and objectives of think tanks in an oped he published in the Wall Street Journal. AEI in its foundation
has made several key contributions to the policy world. The
policy of ―surge‖ in Iraq adopted by the Bush administration
successfully in 2008 was based on Frederick Kagan‘s idea; one
of AEI‘s founders, Raymond Moley, coined the term ―New Deal‖
whereas the brain father of neoliberalism, Milton Friedman was
also a member of this conservative think tank also home to neoconservatism. Thus, DeMuth has argued that policy think tanks
such as AEI have become important centers of applied
scholarship and also ―terribly influential‖ due to the new
methods they have discovered for organizing intellectual
activity. These methods were superior in many respects (by no
means all) to those of traditional research universities. He
reasoned that think tanks were "schools" in the old sense of the
term, namely ―groups of scholars who share a set of
philosophical premises and take them as far as we can in
empirical research, persuasive writing, and arguments among
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ourselves and with those of other schools.‖ The organization
model is also different from universities. The think-tank scholars
are relieved of all administrative duties or privileges and
concentrate solely on research and dissemination, the latter
function also being promoted with alacrity. Think tank
researches are top academics commissioned to study frontburner policy issues and try to influence policy. DeMuth argues
that it takes at least a dozen years for an idea produced at a
think tank to find influence in academic and professional circles.
But, ―think tanks serve as storehouses of ideas, patiently
developed and nurtured, waiting for the crisis when practical
men are desperately seeking a new approach, or for the
inspired leader who sees the possibilities of action before the
crisis arrives.‖63 AEI is of course by no means alone in either
the US, or the global think tank hall of fame. The Center for
American Progress is in the Obama administration what AEI
was in the Bush administration. The Council on Foreign
Relations, the Brookings Institution from the US, Chatham
House, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the
UK, International Crisis Group with offices in several countries
are iconic globally recognized powerhouses among several
others. The think tank community is sprawling not just where is
all began, the US, but all over the world from Turkey to China.
Their track record in influencing policy is mixed and not
comparable to the US where think tanks can serve also as
government in waiting.
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This has to do with funding as much as anything else. The best
funded non-US think tanks include Overseas Development
Institute in London with $25.9 million, German Institute for
International and Security Affairs in Berlin with $16.4 million;
IISS and Chatham House in London with $15.3 and $12.4
million, respectively. The top US think tanks operate with
phenomenal budgets. The annual budget of the Rand
Corporation is a whopping $251 million. Brookings Institution
works on a $60,7; Heritage $48,4; CFR $38,3; Wilson Center
for International Scholars $34,5; Hoover Institute $34,1; and the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace $22 million
dollars.64 Think tanks form one link between scholarship and
practice. They are increasingly a global network and not only
US and Eurocentric although as in academic scholarship also in
this area the standing of non-Western ones are routinely
underrated or even totally ignored.

There are 5,465 think tanks worldwide, 1872 of which are
based in North America. In fact only 350 think tanks are
reportedly based in Washington, more than any country let
alone city. Europe houses 1,722, entire Asia 653; Latin America
and the Caribbean 538; and Oceania 38. Sub-Saharan Africa
boasts a surprisingly high number of 424 think tanks whereas a
relatively low figure of 218 exists in the Middle East and North
Africa. The room for global growth however does exist as
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almost all think tanks were created after 1951, the real take off
occurred after 1980. And, I don‘t know where the Foreign Policy
magazine puts the Turkish think tanks, some of which are
increasingly influential in Turkey and but also abroad.65

In terms of the linkage between scholarship and practice, think
tanks and IR scholarship interact in at least two ways. One is
through educational backgrounds. Typical expert in a research
think tank has an advanced academic degree and probably
spent time teaching at college level, some even continuing both
university

and

consecutively.

think
The

IR

tank

careers

scholarship

simultaneously

that

may

be

or

more

ideologically ―pure‖ in the college research (although that can
well be disputed) is thus applied in the think tank context thanks
to the shared academic base. It is less likely to have this sort of
a revolving door, even in the US, let alone a simultaneous
career track, for a practitioner in international relations, whether
diplomat or political decision maker.

Secondly, both research think tanks and the academia are
publicly vocal institutions which publish extensively and give
interviews. ―Publish or perish‖ is a common motto for both.
While methodologies are completely different, their publications
are monitored to a certain degree by each other. Actually, if a
think tank researcher does not follow what leading academic
scholars in a particular field have been arguing then probably
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that would stand to his\her disadvantage sooner or later. I
would argue that the same should apply to an academic
regarding the research published by think tanks. This mutual
interest would assure crosspollination although method and
degree of immediate relevancy would continue to set the two
apart. Think tanks are one common ground between academia
and practice. However, practical focus and recommendations
by themselves do not assure that the decision makers and their
policy entourage take them on board or even pay serious
attention to them. The problem, and I disagree with Nye and to
a degree Walt in that regard, is not always that the academic
scholarship produces policy irrelevant work, but it is rather that
policy world has a tendency to be inward looking and rather
overwhelmed with daily routines and demands. In that regard,
think tanks are not that much less vulnerable than academia in
getting the attention of the doers.
b. Policy Planning

Another platform that can reconcile scholarship and practice is
the Policy Planning directorates found in the Foreign Ministries
of numerous countries. The Policy Planning unit is essentially
an analysis oriented bureaucratic platform. The website of the
Chinese Foreign Ministry states that ―The Department of Policy
Planning reports on issues of overall and strategic importance
concerning the global situation and in international relations. It
develops diplomatic policies and programs and is involved in
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the drafting of annual foreign assistance plan. It also drafts
important documents and speeches, makes foreign policy
pronouncements, and coordinates research and analytical
work. It oversees the compilation of China's diplomatic history.‖
The German counterpart ―deals with short and medium-term
planning for issues that are relevant to foreign policy, and
prepares topics that are of interest for the Minister's work. To
this end, it works with academic and scientific institutes,
foundations, political consultancy institutions and the policy
planning staffs of other countries. It also hires experts from
academia and business for specific projects, as required. The
Policy

Planning

Staff

helps

coordinate

research

and

development activities within the Federal Government. The
Research Coordinator represents the Federal Foreign Office in
the competent interministerial committee.‖66 The Finnish one
―contributes to the formulation of foreign policy positions and
guidelines and coordinates analyses and research.‖67

Countries as large as the US or much smaller like Bhutan have
such a unit in their foreign affairs ministry with more or less
similar job definitions and purpose. Bhutan‘s Policy Planning
Division for instance, like its cousins around the world ―work on
crosscutting issues involving political, security, human rights
and humanitarian affairs; look at matters that do not fall under
the purview of other departments in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; coordinate matters relating to international media and
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academia.‖ Overall, in its ideal form that hardly exists, the Policy
Planning unit is expected to function as an in-house think tank
which has the possibility of directly impacting policy from within
rather than from without. However, impacting policy is easier
said than done.

The Policy Planning unit is essentially an American creation. It
was founded by the legendary George F. Kennan upon the
order of Secretary of State George Marshall in 1947. Thus,
Kennan who was working in April 1947 on the ―sudden and
urgent problem of aid to Greece and Turkey, was instructed to
set up a planning staff without delay. The reason for urgency
was the desperate situation in Western Europe. Secretary
Marshall emphasized that if the United States didn't take the
initiative to improve matters, others would. Kennan was ordered
to assemble a staff, and to make recommendations within ten
days or two weeks on U.S. actions regarding Europe. The only
advice the general gave him was to ‗avoid trivia.‘" 68 Currently,
the Policy Planning Staff defines its mission as broad analytical
studies of regional and functional issues, identifying gaps in
policy, and initiating policy planning and formulation to fill these
gaps as well as institutionalized "second opinion" on policy
matters - providing recommendations and alternative courses of
action to the Secretary of State; undertaking special projects;
policy coordination; policy articulation including speech writing;
liaison with nongovernmental organizations, the academic
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community, think tanks, and others; planning talks with
counterparts

in

other

countries;

and

dissent

to

bring

constructive, dissenting or alternative views on substantive
foreign policy issues to the Secretary of State and Senior
Department Officials.

The American policy planners have started by helping put
together the Marshall Aid and then played key roles in putting
together Cold War strategy, NATO, the Korean War strategy,
and the response to the 1956 Suez Crisis, to name a few
brightest achievements.69 They had also signed on to several
initiatives that did not take off including the so-called
Community of Democracies and probably scores of others
which no one remembers.

US policy planning directors also assumed visible operational
roles, including Dennis Ross‘ role in the Middle East Peace
Process and Mitchell Reiss‘ role in the Northern Ireland Peace
Process.

The fact of the matter is that, aside from these operational roles
where the policy planner becomes the practitioner, it is hard for
the analysis and planning to impact policy. As Daniel Drezner
argued Policy Planning units face a challenging task of
―balancing the inherent tension between strategic planning and
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operational authority.‖70 Even Kennan himself wrote when he
decided to resign in 1949: ―It is time I recognized that my Policy
Planning Staff, started nearly three years ago, has simply been
a failure, like all previous attempts to bring order and foresight
into the designing of foreign policy by special institutional
arrangements.‖71

As part of the bureaucracy any Policy Planning unit is subject to
tension with expert operational units and the whims of short
term crisis management. Kennan wrote about the impossibility
of having the planning carried out outside the line of command:
―the operating units-the geographical and functional units-will
not take interference from any unit outside the line of
command.‖72 The essential requirement to exercise genuine
influence is to have the ear of the Minister, assuming of course
that the Minister has the ear of the Prime Minister\President.
Although Kennan‘s association with Secretary Marshal is
considered exemplary, perhaps an even tighter relationship
existed between Henry Kissinger and his Policy Planning
Director Winston Lord, who followed Kissinger from the National
Security Council to the State Department. However, his case
demonstrated as documented by Daniel Madar that ―For
planners concerned with being effective, usefulness defines not
so much what may be explored, but what is practical to
present.‖ The Minister finds the work of the Policy Planners
useful because it reflects the Minister‘s criteria of relevance.
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This circumscribes the independent thinking of the very unit that
is, theoretically, tasked to do just that in support of better policy.
Yet, ―If, on the other hand, they are not involved at the top, they
will have substantive independence, but no effectiveness.‖73

These internal problems are likely to be universal. However,
they are not the only challenges of policy planning. The fact of
the matter is that policy planning concerns prognostication of
and intervention in events that did not yet occur. The past and
present do not necessarily indicate the future. In this sense, to
borrow

Steven

Bernstein

and

his

colleagues‘

catchy

formulation, ―God really gave physics the easier question‖. This
is fundamentally impossible, yet necessary to try. Planning
needs to occur if only to narrow down options, prepare the
minds for the range of possibilities in the spirit of US President
Eisenhower‘s famous motto: Plans are nothing, planning is
everything. As Bloomfield rightly asserts: ―Large and small
powers alike need new mental and conceptual tools for their
survival in a world essentially beyond their control.‖74

What the academic community and theory has to offer to policy
planning is however subject to elaboration. The attack on the
academic work in this regard is severe: ―Much theoretical and
methodological work in the social sciences is unfortunately
irrelevant to the needs of real-world planning, either because it
is not applicable, or is still in the theory-building stage, or
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because some of it is excessively primitive and even shoddy.‖ 75
Others have asserted that policy planning is a different kind of
intellectual work. After all, it is ―directed at that which has not
yet happened, which means that the criteria on which we base
our discussions of our contributions to it cannot model itself
effortlessly on the scientific practices we follow in our scholarly
work.‖76 But, the historical knowledge and theoretical insights of
the academics should hold some value. The task then, the
argument goes, is to present these contributions in forms that
are accessible and accepted as policy-relevant. The academic
profession is cut off from the current policy debates because
essentially: ―Scholars in international relations tend to privilege
arguments that reach back into the past and parse out one or
two causal variables that are then posited to be the major
driving forces of past and future outcomes.‖77 Therefore, a
method that is more appropriate than deductive-nomothetic
theory is needed by the IR scholarship in order to be relevant.

This may take the form of hypotheses of how the future may
unfold based on a chain of logic that connects drivers to
outcomes, otherwise known as ―scenarios‖. Steven Bernstein
et.al. make a strong point on the point that ―scenario-based
forward thinking is a promising method for tracking the policies
of actors and the evolution of the international system.‖ 78 Thus,
argue Neuman and Overland, ―Scenario planning may be a
heuristic skill that may come in handy in this regard. Building
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and disseminating scenarios for the future is not traditional
scholarly work. If one wants to have an impact on running
policy, however, it may nonetheless be work for scholars.‖79

Scenario building has in fact long been used in business. Shell
is known to be working with scenarios since the 1960‘s. It is
also spreading to government as the US National Intelligence
Council‘s Global Trends 2025 report shows. Horizon scanning
and scenario building are becoming legitimate instruments for
policy planning, which almost universally is ―notoriously laggard
in using or applying social science research tools, even the
potentially valuable ones.‖80 I would argue that this will help
partially but obviously not entirely mitigate some of the
dilemmas of policy planning as a common platform for science
and practice.

The academic work will be essentially different from both the
think tank and the policy planning activities. This point is
uncontested at least in my eyes. That said, cross fertilization
and mutual reckoning can be increased by enhancing common
platforms, recognizing shared tasks and simply mutually paying
due notice.
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VI

CONCLUSION

In this essay I have proposed a few theses to conceptualize
world orders and change. Accordingly, I have argued that:

-

Any international order is reflects the global political and
economic architecture which in turn is a codification
permitted by a given period‘s circumstances.

-

As such, a world order is not a novel creation but an
arrangement that is naturally selected from among the
already extant options.

-

The next order will be carrying the genes of its predecessor
complete with several flaws that pass from generation to
generation.

-

A world order is shaped by the enduring interests and the
mental image of the leading actors.
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-

Every ensuing order rectifies some of the flaws of the
previous generation of orders.

-

Any world order is also composed of a number of concurrent
economic, political, military; global and regional orders.

-

The world orders to date were never truly universal.

-

Yet, the trend is towards more and more expansive orders
both in terms of geographical reach and in terms of the
multiple layers of everyday life that the world order
arrangements regulate.

-

That said the world order experience is relative to how close
within or without one is located to the center of the order.

-

And, last but not least, the rises and falls of world orders do
not happen in a deterministic fashion. Decisions, cultures
and personalities do matter.

The current world order may just have been forged in a single
continuum, probably since the Enlightenment in Europe, but
more visibly since 19th century, with major turning points,
moments of acceleration and deceleration, and a certain
handover of lead roles. This single continuum included
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moments of systemic shifts. But, those shifts have pushed
forward ideas, structures and powers that were already around
waiting for their opportune moment.

The current economic crisis is unlikely to force a wholesale
world order change. It may even reinforce the position of the
central players simultaneously while bringing in more powers
from the periphery to the center of globalization. Several
regions will experience significant volatility. However, as the
saying goes, the news of the demise of American dominance is
grossly exaggerated. Similarly, neoliberal economic model is
neither triumphant nor dead. But it is significantly challenged.
The axis of contention will be between state capitalism and
illiberal democracy on the one side versus free market economy
-as mitigated by renewed vigor of social state- and pluralistic
democracy on the other. Both sides in the above equation
would be contained within the system and will stand separate
from those failing state structures that will not be able to adjust
and take part in globalization. In terms of institutions, no major
institutional structure is likely to disappear in this crisis. The
current economic shock is great enough to stimulate the growth
of a new order; but not strong enough to obliterate the
old/existing one.

However, this should not obscure the fact that a new set of
arrangements which future generations will call world order are
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already in development and incubation. Until the old is replaced
by the new, there is a coming positive redundancy of world
orders. It is realistic to expect the current system to linger while
the elements of the new order take stronger hold. The task then
is to make sure that the two do not work counter purposes or
their generational tensions do not culminate in a seismic
discontinuity bringing a revolutionary new order or disorder to
life.

The academia and practitioners will be well advised to sharpen
the tools of working together. Scenario based studies, common
platforms such as the policy planning units and think tanks as
well as minimal respect for each other would go a long way in
helping both the academia and the policy wonks. After all, the
founders of social sciences wanted to make the world a better
place through the illumination of scholarship. To them theory
could not be separate from policy. Theory‘s shortcomings in
addressing

the

problems

of

actual

politics

would

be

disappointing after decades of IR scholarship. Rejection of the
link, on the other hand, would have seemed unacceptable to
them, as it seems inauspicious to this author.
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